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1.  INTRODUCTION
The Microsoft cases in the United States and in Europe have been influ-
ential in determining the contours of the substantive liability standards 
for dominant firms in US antitrust law and in EC competition law. The 
competition  law  remedies  that  were  adopted,  following  the  finding  of 
liability, seem, however, to constitute the main measure for the ‘success’ of 
the case(s). An important disagreement exists between those arguing that 
the remedies put in place failed to address the roots of the competition 
law violation identified in the liability decision and others who advance 
the view that the remedies were far-  reaching and that their alleged failure 
demonstrates the weakness of the liability claim. This study evaluates these 
claims by examining the variety of remedies that were finally imposed in 
the EC Microsoft cases, from a comparative perspective. The study begins 
with a discussion of the roots of the Microsoft issues in Europe and the 
consequent choice of a remedial approach by the European Commission 
and the European Court of First Instance (CFI). It then explores the 
effectiveness of the remedies in achieving the aims that were set. The non-
  consideration of the structural remedy in the European case and the pros 
and cons of developing such a remedy in the future are briefly discussed 
before more emphasis is put on alternative remedies (competition and 
non-  competition law ones) that have been suggested in the literature. The 
study concludes by discussing the fit between the remedy and the theory 
of consumer harm that led to the finding of liability and questions a total 
dissociation between the two. We believe that it is important to think 
seriously about potential remedies before litigation begins. However, we 
do not require an ex ante identification of an appropriate remedy by the 
plaintiffs, since this could lead to underenforcement or overenforcement.
In 2004, the European Commission adopted a Decision declaring that 394  Microsoft on trial
Microsoft  had  violated  Article  82  EC1  by  committing  two  abuses  of 
its dominant position on the market for PC operating systems (the first 
EC Microsoft case).2 Microsoft was held to have abused its dominant 
position by refusing to supply competitors with certain interoperability 
information and to allow them to use it for the purpose of developing 
and distributing competing products on the market for work group server 
operating systems. It also found that Microsoft had infringed Article 82 
EC by making supply of its client PC operating system Windows con-
ditional on the simultaneous acquisition of its Windows Media Player 
(WMP). The CFI affirmed the Decision of the Commission in 2007.3
Following complaints by Opera, the Norwegian web-  browser devel-
oper, in December 2007 the Commission initiated investigations and sent 
a Statement of Objection (SO) in January 20094 alleging a violation by 
Microsoft of Article 82 EC for tying its web-  browser Internet Explorer 
to its dominant client PC operating system Windows. On 16 December 
2009 the Commission gave its approval to the choice screen proposal sug-
gested by Microsoft and adopted an Article 9 of Reg. 1/2003 commitment 
decision5
This  study  will  focus  on  the  remedies  that  were  adopted  by  the 
Commission and confirmed by the CFI in the first EC Microsoft case, as 
well as those accepted by the Commission in the second EC Microsoft 
case, and will not examine the liability issue or the specific substantive 
standards for the finding of an abuse of dominant position in EC com-
petition  law.6  Although  there  will  be  some  references  to  the  remedial 
1  Article  82  of  the  EC  Treaty  prohibits  the  abuse  of  a  dominant  position 
that one or more undertakings have in a relevant market when there is an affect on 
trade between Member States.
2  Commission  Decision  2007/53/EC  of  24  March  2004  [2007]  OJ  L32/23 
(‘the Decision’).
3  Case  T-  201/04  Microsoft  Corp.  v  Commission  [2007]  ECR  II-  3601  (‘CFI 
judgment’).
4  European  Commission,  MEMO  09/15,  17  January  2009,  available  at 
Europa Press Release.
5  See  European  Commission  at  http://europa.edu/rapid/pressReleases-
Action.do?reference=IP/091941  and  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
cases/decisions/39530/final_decision_en.pdf (full version). In the final settlement, 
Microsoft  made  additional  commitments  on  interoperability  between  rivals’ 
software and its own, including Windows, Windows server, Office, Exchange and 
SharePoint.
6  On  the  tying  part  of  the  case,  see  Nicholas  Economides  and  Ioannis 
Lianos, ‘The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United 
States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases’ (2009) 76(2) Antitrust Law Journal 
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strategy adopted in the United States for practices that were closely related 
to those condemned in the EC Microsoft case, this study will also not sys-
tematically compare the US remedy with the EC remedy, for the simple 
reason that each remedy addressed a different competition law problem, 
and therefore required the adoption of different measures to address that 
problem.
Competition law remedies are adopted with the aim to restore competi-
tion in the market: this includes the ‘micro’ goal of putting the infringe-
ment  to  an  end,  compensating  the  victims,7  and  curing  the  particular 
problem to competition, but also the ‘macro’ goal of putting incentives 
in place ‘so as to minimize the recurrence of just such anti-  competitive 
conduct’.8 This study embraces a broader view of the concept of rem-
edies  than  Council  Regulation  1/2003  on  the  implementation  of  the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.9 
Competition law remedies seek generally to restore ‘the plaintiff’s rightful 
7  Taking illegal gains away from the law violators and ‘restoring the monies 
to the victims’ constitutes a principal goal of competition law remedies: see Robert 
Pitofsky,  ‘Antitrust  at  the  Turn  of  the  Twenty-  First  Century:  The  Matter  of 
Remedies’ (2002) 91 Georgia Law Journal 169, 170.
8  Eleanor Fox, ‘Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalized 
World: How Globalization Corrupts Relief’ (2005) 80 Tulane Law Review 571, 
573.
9  Council  Regulation  1/2003  [2003]  OJ  L1/1.  According  to  Article  7  of 
Regulation 1/2003, the aim of competition law remedies is ‘to bring the infringe-
ment effectively to an end’. Remedies should therefore be distinguished from sanc-
tions against undertakings, as the latter have the aim to punish the infringer and 
to provide compensation to victims or society in general. See also, on the distinc-
tion between remedies and sanctions, OECD, Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of 
Dominance Cases, DAF/COMP(2006) (May 2007), p. 18, available at www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/20/17/38623413.pdf: ‘(t)ypically, remedies aim to stop a violator’s 
unlawful conduct, its anticompetitive effects, and their recurrence, as well as to 
restore competition. Sanctions are usually meant to deter unlawful conduct in 
the future, to compensate victims, and to force violators to disgorge their illegal 
gains’. This distinction does not adequately take into account that sanctions and 
damages often affect the incentives of the wrongdoers in their future behaviour on 
the market. This study adopts a broader view of remedies, which includes differ-
ent aims, allegedly also those performed by sanctions, such as stopping the illegal 
conduct  and  preventing  its  recurrence,  restoring  competition,  deterrence,  just 
compensation, disgorgement of illicit profits. This overall approach may provide 
a more useful analytical framework for analysing the effect of competition law on 
the specific market. Furthermore, the restrictive position adopted by Regulation 
1/2003 concerns public enforcement and does not take into account the emerg-
ing role of private enforcement in EC competition law, following the publication 
of the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust rules, 
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position, that is, to the position that the plaintiff would have occupied 
if defendant had never violated the law’ or ‘to restore the defendant to 
the defendant’s rightful position, that is, the position that the defendant 
would have occupied absent the violation’.10 In other words, remedies are 
a cure to a ‘wrong’ the defendant committed, ‘in contravention of some 
legally-  recognised right of the plaintiff’s’11 or of the category of right-
  recipients that the legislator aimed to protect. The wrong of the defendant 
gives rise to the enforceable right of the plaintiff (or the protected cat-
egory) to impose on the defendant a correlative duty of stopping the illegal 
behaviour, paying damages, making restitution, or adopting a specific 
behaviour. An important aspect in the definition of remedies is therefore 
to determine who would be the beneficiary of this right, in other words the 
protected category that retains the right to impose a correlative duty to the 
defendant. We will assume that the protected category is the consumers of 
the relevant market harmed by the ‘wrong’ committed by the defendant.12 
A wider perspective would be to consider that the protected category con-
sists of the ‘broader public’ who derive benefits from the principle of com-
petition, allegedly jeopardized by the practices of the dominant firm.13
Whichever  perspective  is  chosen,  ‘restoring  competition’  should  not 
be  interpreted  as  reaching  perfect  competition  (or  free  competition  if 
one takes a deontological perspective), which is practically unattainable, 
and in some cases normatively an undesirable objective from a public 
policy perspective.14 The remedy aims to restore the market that would 
10  Douglas  Laycock,  Modern  American  Remedies:  Cases  and  Materials 
(Little, Brown, 1994), p. 2.
11  Michael  Tilbury,  Michael  Noone  and  Bruce  Kercher,  Remedies: 
Commentary and Materials (3rd edn, LBC Information Services, 2000), p. 1.
12  In this case, consumer welfare or consumer sovereignty will be proxies of 
consumer harm.
13  See  the  Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Kokott  in  Case  C-  8/08  T-  Mobile 
Netherlands BV and others,[19 February 2009, paras 58 and 71, defending the view that 
the objective of EC competition law is to ‘protect competition as such’ because this is 
of benefit, not only for consumers but for ‘the public at large’. In Case C-  8/08 T-  Mobile 
Netherlands BV and others, 4 June 2009, para. 38, the European Court of Justice 
accepted that ‘Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed 
to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but 
also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such’ but did not 
adopt the position of Advocate General Kokott with regard to the ultimate beneficiar-
ies of the principle of competition, thus suggesting that a possible interpretation of the 
aims of EC competition law is the avoidance of a long-  term consumer harm.
14  In industries with significant network effects, even in the absence of anti-
  competitive actions, the natural equilibrium is neither perfect competition nor 
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have existed in the absence of the conduct found illegal, that is, what is 
commonly called the ‘but for’ market conditions.
Competition law remedies list also a prophylactic objective: ‘ensure that 
there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future’.15 
This is certainly a difficult enterprise that requires from the courts a guess-
ing exercise linked to a counterfactual analysis of the situation in the 
market with and without the specific competition law violations. This is 
particularly true in complex and dynamically evolving markets, where 
static models cannot easily predict the situation that would have existed 
absent the restraint. It also requires a difficult decision on the appropri-
ate remedy enforcement mechanism, as the judge should decide on the 
degree of her involvement (as opposed to market forces or regulatory 
institutions) in the operation. One could indeed perceive the operation of 
designing appropriate remedies as being, first of all, a decision over the 
need for regulatory interference in order to bring the self-  correcting forces 
of the market back to their usual operation, as the default mechanism that 
would adjust the incentives of market actors and therefore the interaction 
between supply and demand in the specific sector of the economy. Thus, 
remedies could be (i) setting up conditions for the market to work, or (ii) 
directly influencing or guiding the market.
There are, of course, different choices that can be made and combined 
in order to affect the incentives of market actors and restore ‘competi-
tion’, defined as the best possible outcome for the consumers of the spe-
cific relevant market in terms of price, quality, variety, innovation etc., if 
one assumes (as does this study) a consumer-  driven competition law and 
policy. First, it is possible to contract out the remedy to other affected 
market participants by enabling them to sue for the recuperation of the 
market for operating systems of PCs, are ‘winner takes most’ markets with signifi-
cant market share and profits inequality as well as high concentration. Thus, the 
‘but for’ world that would have existed in the absence of anti-  competitive actions is 
one of very significant inequality. Attempting to impose the perfectly competitive 
egalitarian environment of a non-  network industry can lead to lower social benefits. 
See Nicholas Economides, ‘The Economics of Networks’ (1996) 14 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 675, available at www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/
Economides_Economics_of_Networks.pdf;  Nicholas  Economides  and  Fredrick 
Flyer, Compatibility and Market Structure for Network Goods, Discussion Paper 
EC-  98-  02 (Stern School of Business, New York University), available at www.
stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-  02.pdf; and Nicholas Economides, ‘Competition Policy 
in Network Industries: An Introduction’ in Dennis Jansen (ed.), The New Economy 
and Beyond: Past, Present and Future (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), available 
at www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Competition_Policy.pdf.
15  See United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001).398  Microsoft on trial
damages suffered because of the conduct found illegal or for more than 
the damages incurred in order to deter market participants from adopting 
a similar anti-  competitive conduct in the future. Secondly, it is possible to 
develop remedies that would affect the discretion of market participants to 
run their business, in other words affect their autonomy as market partici-
pants and consequently their incentives. The latter could be conceived as a 
continuum ranging from preserving some degree of discretion for market 
participants (in the case of contractual remedies, such as commitments) to 
purely non-  voluntary schemes, unilaterally imposed by the public authori-
ties. One could also distinguish remedies that relate to the conduct of the 
market participants and attempt to affect their incentives to adopt a spe-
cific form of conduct (by creating disincentives such as fines, or, more bru-
tally, by imposing injunctions, interdictions, conduct remedies) from more 
intrusive remedies that affect the infringing company’s or   management’s 
status (criminal sanctions, structural remedies).
The next section will briefly discuss the roots of the Microsoft issues 
in  Europe  and  the  consequent  choice  of  a  remedial  approach  by  the 
Commission and the CFI. The third section will critically assess the effec-
tiveness of these remedies. Time has been relatively short since these rem-
edies were adopted to be able to proffer a well-  substantiated judgement 
on the success of the remedial strategy adopted in Europe. Two sources of 
wisdom will, however, be employed in order to make a relatively informed 
assessment of the remedial part of the EC Microsoft case so far. First, we 
will refer to the example of the US Microsoft cases and the effectiveness 
of the remedial strategy employed, not only in order to add a compara-
tive law perspective to this study but because the EC remedial strategy has 
been influenced by the US remedial experience in the US Microsoft case. 
Secondly, we will incorporate in our analysis the recent business history of 
this specific sector and the emergence of new market characteristics, new 
products and competitors, as is usually the case in the rapidly evolving high-
  tech markets. The fourth section will discuss the non-  consideration of the 
structural remedy in the EC case and will reflect on the prospects of devel-
oping such a remedy in the future. The fourth part will conclude by discuss-
ing alternative remedies (competition and non-  competition law ones) that 
have been suggested in the literature and that could provide the adequate 
incentives to market participants. The final section will conclude.16
16  The  important  issue  of  the  proportionality  of  the  remedies  imposed  to 
Microsoft will be the object of another study: Nicholas Economides and Ioannis 
Lianos, ‘A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the EU Microsoft Cases’, forthcom-
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2.    DESIGNING OPTIMAL REMEDIES AND THE 
ROOTS OF THE MICROSOFT PROBLEM IN 
EUROPE
The design of optimal remedies requires a clear identification of the com-
petition law problem that the antitrust remedy is attempting to address. It 
may be that competition authorities and courts develop different remedial 
strategies  for  precisely  similar  or  analogous  fact  patterns,  because  the 
competition law problems that were identified as the source of consumer 
harm in the liability phase of the decision are different. This study builds 
on the assumption that consumers should be at the centre of the attention 
of competition law enforcers, not only at the liability phase of the decision, 
but also at the remedy phase.
In the background of the finding of a competition law violation there is 
always a consumer harm story, in other words a narrative of consumer harm 
that is built on specific inferences from the facts of the case and that is estab-
lished by different types of evidence: circumstantial, empirical or theoretical, 
quantitative or qualitative. In order to understand and assess the remedies 
adopted in the Microsoft case, we need to briefly unravel the dominant nar-
rative of consumer harm that led to the adoption of these specific remedies. 
Additionally, often actions can be identified as anti-  competitive and their 
likely effect can be determined, but the quantification of their effect is much 
more difficult. Thus, a full restoration of the market to the ‘but for’ world 
may be unfeasible. Often all that can be done is to eliminate the   impediments 
to competition that resulted from anti-  competitive actions.
In  Europe,  the  dominant  narratives  of  consumer  harm  in  the  first 
Microsoft EC case were two: first, an issue of lack of interoperability 
and compatibility that allegedly harmed consumers; secondly, a story of 
leveraging. Both stories are different from the dominant narrative of the 
US Microsoft case, although they also relate to the business strategy of 
Microsoft to integrate different applications in its Windows platform, the 
source of Microsoft troubles in the United States. However, there are dif-
ferent views on the anti-  competitive effects of this strategy of integration. 
While in the United States, the main story of anti-  competitive harm was 
that Microsoft was essentially attempting to preserve the dominance of the 
Windows’ platform,17 in Europe the Commission and the CFI   perceived 
17  The  leveraging  attempted  monopolization  part  of  the  browser  market 
claim was not successful. See United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 80–1, 
although an undertone of leveraging theory existed in some other claims. See e.g. 
the integration of Internet Explorer and Windows (253 F.3d at 65–6).400  Microsoft on trial
Microsoft’s strategy as essentially being focused on the applications part of 
the business, where it attempted to extend its dominant position through 
the network effects of its platform.18 The different narratives of consumer 
harm justified the choice of a different remedial strategy.
Institutional differences with the United States, such as the unavail-
ability of civil remedies (fines) for infringements of sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act, while fines are frequently imposed in Europe, may also 
explain the different remedy mixture in each jurisdiction. Private enforce-
ment and damages actions are also less frequent in Europe than in the 
United States. Frederic Jenny rightly observes the close relation between 
civil sanctions and damages, from a deterrence perspective, even if the 
beneficiaries of the compensation are different in each case:
(i)t makes no difference whether payments are made to the state budget or to 
consumers. Thus the current discussion in the EU on private enforcement should 
take into account the fact that even if the purpose of private enforcement is to 
compensate victims rather than to punish violators, the possibility of adding 
compensatory damages to administrative (or criminal) sanctions increases the 
overall cost of being caught for violators and therefore increases the deterrent 
effect of the enforcement system. This means that when considering whether an 
enforcement system is over deterrent or under deterrent (and when considering 
whether more or less resources should be devoted to public enforcement), one 
should take into account the effect of the interaction between public and private 
enforcement. For example in jurisdictions (such as the US) where it is relatively 
easy for victims to bring civil suits against antitrust violators that have inflicted 
harm on them, there is, ceteris paribus, less need for public enforcement than 
in countries where it is more difficult to bring such actions (such as in the EC 
Member  States).  Cross-  Atlantic  comparisons  of  fining  policies  between  the 
US Department of Justice and the EC Commission sometimes seem to suggest 
antitrust enforcement is as vigorous in the EC as in the US because the level of 
sanctions meted out by the Commission tends to be nearly as high (or some-
times higher) as penalties obtained by the US Department of Justice. But if 
such comparisons do not take into account civil enforcement as well as public 
enforcement, they can be highly misleading.19
18  The Commission also argued that Microsoft had a maintenance of monop-
oly/defensive leveraging objective for the interoperability part of the Decision: 
Decision, paras 768–70, but the extension of monopoly power was the primary 
concern in both the interoperability and the tying parts of the case. See also, 
CFI judgment, paras 1288, 1327, 1344 (‘it must be borne in mind at the outset 
that the two abuses at issue form part of a leveraging infringement, consisting 
in Microsoft’s use of its dominant position on the client PC operating systems 
market to extend that dominant position to two adjacent markets, namely the 
market for work group server operating systems and the market for streaming 
media players’).
19  Frederic Jenny, ‘Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: From Theory to Policy   Quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases    401
The alleged consumer harm narrative is intrinsically related to the impo-
sition of a specific duty on the defendant to cure the wrong committed. It 
therefore affects the mixture of the different types of remedies adopted. 
In some cases, that will require the adoption of a specific duty to act 
(conduct remedies). In other cases, it will entail a substitutionary (pecuni-
ary) remedy, often when it is difficult or impossible to cure all the negative 
effects of the practice on the protected category with conduct remedies. It 
is therefore important to understand the mixture of all types of remedies, 
specific and substitutionary, adopted by different jurisdictions in order to 
form an idea on their comparative effectiveness. We will first discuss the 
conduct remedies imposed on Microsoft in Europe before examining the 
substitutionary remedies (fines, damages).
Specific (Conduct) Remedies
The  Commission  adopted  conduct  remedies  for  both  anti-  competitive 
practices of Microsoft. These remedies should respect the usual require-
ments of proportionality20 and the existence of a relation between the 
remedy  and  the  infringement  that  has  been  established.21  The  first 
remedy addressed the interoperability/compatibility issue, the second the 
tying/leveraging issue.
Interoperability/compatibility
The Commission found that Microsoft had refused to provide Sun with 
information enabling it to design work group server operating systems 
which could seamlessly integrate in the ‘Active Directory’ domain archi-
tecture, a web of interrelated client PC-  to-  server and server-  to-  server pro-
tocols that organize Windows work group networks. Microsoft’s refusal 
to provide interoperability to Sun was found to be part of a broader 
pattern of conduct of refusing the relevant information to any vendor of 
work group server operating systems. Microsoft developed this strategy 
after it had, for a certain period of time, provided analogous informa-
tion  for  previous  versions  of  Microsoft’s  products  to  Sun  and  to  the 
industry at large. The Commission found that this disruption of previous 
Options’ in I. Lianos and I. Kokkoris, The Reform of European Competition Law: 
New Challenges (The Hague: Kluwer, 2009).
20  Case 15/83 Denkavit [1984] ECR 2171, para. 25 and Case C-  354/95 R v 
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte National Farmers’ Union and 
others [1997] ECR I-  4559, paras 49 and 50.
21  Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents and others v Commission 
[1974] ECR 223, para. 45402  Microsoft on trial
levels of supply eliminated competition in the relevant market for work 
group server operating systems, as this information was indispensable for 
  competitors operating in that market.22
The objective pursued by Microsoft was to leverage the quasi-  monopoly 
power it had in the operating systems market to the work group server 
systems market. Due to network effects, Windows is an indispensable plat-
form for most applications. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission 
relied on evidence that there was a link between the enhanced interoper-
ability from which Microsoft’s work group server operating systems ben-
efited, in comparison to competing work group server operating systems, 
and the rapid rise to dominance of Microsoft’s applications in the work 
group  server  operating  systems  market.  The  Commission  proceeded 
even further and attempted to show consumer harm, as in the absence 
of Microsoft’s refusal to provide interoperability, the competitors would 
have been able to provide new and enhanced products to consumers. The 
Decision of the Commission did not include any evidence of the exist-
ence of projects for new products or investments that were not carried on 
because of Microsoft’s conduct. Rather, it emphasized the indirect nature 
of consumer harm provoked by Microsoft, which put interoperability at 
the centre stage of the competitive struggle. Consumers seemed, however, 
to attach greater importance to other product characteristics, such as reli-
ability and security. The Commission rejected the objective justifications 
advanced  by  Microsoft.  The  Commission  did  not  make  a  full  market 
inquiry on whether the free provision of software and the expansion of 
functionality of Windows create benefits to consumers. Such potential 
benefits should have been balanced with the losses to consumers from the 
alleged anti-  competitive actions.
The European Court of Justice’s case law recognizes that in exceptional 
circumstances a refusal to license may constitute an abuse under Article 82 
EC.23 This was found to be the case, after the Commission proceeded to a 
22  The  exact  market  definition  for  interoperable  systems  was  contested 
between  Microsoft  and  the  Commission.  Here  we  take  the  liability  verdict  as 
given.
23  For  an  analysis,  see  Ioannis  Lianos,  ‘Competition  Law  and  Intellectual 
Property Rights: Is the Property Rights’ Approach Right?’ in John Bell and Claire 
Kilpatrick (eds), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2006), pp. 153–86. The CFI gave a broad interpretation of the ‘new 
product rule’ in comparison to the previous case law: ‘(t)he circumstance relating 
to the appearance of a new product as envisaged in Magill and IMS Health . . . 
cannot be the only parameter which determines whether a refusal to license an 
intellectual property right is capable of causing prejudice to consumers within the 
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qualitative balancing of the incentives of Microsoft and its competitors to 
innovate in the marketplace. Imposing a duty to provide interoperability 
would not reduce Microsoft’s incentives to innovate, because, from the 
Commission’s point of view, this is the way competition takes place in 
this industry. It will also preserve the incentives to innovate of Microsoft’s 
competitors. This finding was based on three implicit assumptions: first, 
competition constitutes the most adequate market structure to promote 
innovation in the software market;24 secondly, Microsoft’s competitors 
would have the incentive to provide new products and functionalities to 
consumers in order to be able to compete and would not clone Microsoft’s 
products; and thirdly, that the Commission-  imposed disclosures on inter-
operability  among  Microsoft  servers  would  not  diminish  Microsoft’s 
incentives to innovate in systems of servers. Further direct evidence of 
exclusionary  intent,  such  as  company  internal  documents,  carried  the 
conviction of the Commission that Microsoft’s objective was to restrict 
competition in the work group server operating systems market.
In adopting the conclusion on Microsoft’s liability, the Commission 
was indirectly influenced by the existence of a previous remedial strategy 
addressing problems of interoperability in the software sector.25 In fact, 
although the decision of the Commission targeted the refusal of interoper-
ability by Microsoft to Sun, it is clear from the general description of the 
competition law problem with which the Commission was confronted in 
this case that it envisioned the issue of interoperability more broadly and 
therefore not strictly confined to the facts of the specific case. For example, 
the  Commission  referred  to  the  strong  network  effects  that  existed  in 
this market, thus reducing considerably the contestability of Microsoft’s 
there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical devel-
opment’: CFI judgment, para. 647. The focus on the limitation of technical devel-
opment to the detriment of consumers widens the scope of application of Article 
82 EC in comparison to the position of the European Court of Justice in Joined 
Case C-  241 and 242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECR I-  743, para. 50 
(‘Magill’) and Case C-  418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR I-  5039, paras 
34–5, which found that except in exceptional circumstances, a refusal to license 
intellectual property rights cannot by itself constitute an abuse of a dominant posi-
tion. Such cumulative exceptional circumstances exist when the refusal to license is 
unjustified, prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential 
consumer demand and excludes ‘any’ or ‘all’ competition on a secondary market.
24  In reaching this conclusion, the Commission did not fully consider innova-
tion by new companies that might be bought by the dominant company or with 
whom it might create strategic alliances, and then their products would be sold or 
marketed by the dominant company.
25  Commission Decision IV/29.479, IBM.404  Microsoft on trial
dominance in the platform and applications parts of its business. The 
Commission also emphasized, when it examined the issue of Microsoft’s 
dominant position, the ‘strong commercial and technical associative links’ 
between the PC operating systems market and the work group server oper-
ating systems market, with the result that ‘Microsoft’s dominance over 
the PC operating systems market has a significant impact on the adjacent 
market for operating systems for work group servers’.26 This observation 
communicates the idea that the competition law problem with which the 
Commission was confronted was of a structural nature (relating to the 
nature of the market and not necessarily linked to the specific characteris-
tics of the excluded rivals) and therefore required the development of a set 
of remedies that would address the problem of interoperability at its core.
The Commission referred to previous industry practice, in particular 
the licence agreement with AT&T relating to the disclosure of portions 
of the Windows source code,27 to previous decisional practice, such as 
the IBM precedent, and to the existing regulatory framework, in order to 
emphasize the need to establish interoperability in the software market. 
Furthermore, the EC Software Directive adopted in 199128 restricted the 
exercise of copyright over software (including exercise by non-  dominant 
undertakings)  for  interoperability  reasons  and  explicitly  provided  that 
its  provisions  were  without  prejudice  to  the  application  of  Article  82 
EC, in particular if a dominant undertaking refused to make available 
  information which is necessary for interoperability.29
The main objective of the remedy was thus to restore interoperability, 
at least to the same degree that existed on the market before the alleged 
disruption by Microsoft of the previous supply of information. This raised 
two difficulties.
First, the Commission had to define the requisite degree of interoper-
ability. This is an issue linked to both the liability and the remedy parts of 
the decision. Microsoft argued that it already provided some form of inter-
operability, which was allegedly found insufficient by the Commission, 
as  this  degree  of  interoperability  was  still  providing  an  advantage  to 
Microsoft’s  work  group  server  operating  systems.  The  issue  could  be 
framed as a platform neutrality problem: where a platform owner also 
provides complementary goods or services (applications), which rely on 
the platform and which compete with other applications. Had Microsoft 
26  Decision, para. 526. 
27  Decision, para. 212.
28  Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of 
computer programs [1991] OJ L122/42 (‘Software Directive’).
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not provided full (or native) interoperability to its own work group server 
operating  systems,  after  providing  the  same  degree  of  interoperability 
in  the  past  with  competing  applications,  most  likely  the  Commission 
would not have found a violation of Article 82 EC. In other words, the 
Commission understood interoperability in relative (not absolute) terms, 
requiring in systems composed of components of different companies the 
same level of interoperability achieved between the dominant platform’s 
components. This created a paradox as the Active Directory did not exist 
in the past (before Windows 2000) and Microsoft had not provided inter-
operability information in the past. Rather, what Microsoft provided was 
a licence to the source code of Windows itself, for others (mainly AT&T) 
to  use  to  build  bridges  between  UNIX  and  Windows.  But  providing 
Windows source code was not what the Commission wanted Microsoft 
to do. Secondly, the Commission had to decide the institutional arrange-
ment that would have achieved most effectively the required degree of 
interoperability. This issue relates to the implementation mechanism for 
the remedy, which raised important difficulties.
Defining the Requisite Degree of Interoperability
One could attempt a comparison between the EC interoperability remedy 
and the interoperability remedy imposed in the US Microsoft case: contrary 
to the EC case, interoperability was a minor point of the liability claims 
of the US Department of Justice and the 19 states against Microsoft. Of 
course, incompatibility between different operating systems (OS) created 
a inequality in market shares, with Microsoft ending with a lion’s share of 
the OS market for PCs.30 Thus, it could be argued that the lack of techni-
cal compatibility in operating systems (the fact that Windows applications 
do not run on Linux or Apple in native mode and vice versa) resulted in 
dominance by Microsoft in the market for OS for PCs, and in turn this 
was the foundation of Microsoft’s distributional advantage for any type of 
application or middleware that could be added to the Windows platform.
30  In  industries  with  strong  network  effects,  lack  of  compatibility  leads  to 
a natural equilibrium of severe market share and profit inequality even in the 
absence  of  anti-  competitive  acts.  See,  Nicholas  Economides,  ‘Public  Policy  in 
Network Industries’ in Paolo Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics 
(Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  2008),  available  at  www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/
Economides_Public_Policy_In_Network_Industries.pdf.  When  anti-  competitive 
acts are proven, the appropriate remedy should not be to restore perfect competi-
tion with egalitarian market shares and profits but rather the natural oligopoly 
equilibrium that has severe market share and profits inequality.406  Microsoft on trial
The US case    The issues in the US case were mainly the contractual and 
technological integration of Internet Explorer and Windows, along with a 
number of measures adopted with relation to Internet Explorer (IE), and 
a number of acts adopted with the aim to undermine Sun’s cross-  platform 
Java. In order to build a stronger integration between IE and Windows, 
Microsoft had adopted a number of practices, such as (i) imposing licence 
restrictions  barring  original  equipment  manufacturers  (OEMs)  from  a 
number of activities, such as removing IE icons, causing a new interface 
to load in place of Windows, altering the appearance of the Windows 
desktop;  (ii)  designing  Windows  to  exclude  IE  from  the  Add/Remove 
Programs utility or to commingle IE only and shell code in the same files 
and otherwise technologically tying IE with Windows; (iii) entering agree-
ments with Internet access and content providers to promote and favour 
IE and IE technologies; (iv) contractually tying IE with Windows.
The theory behind the case, accepted by Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson 
of the District Court in his liability decision,31 was mainly that Microsoft’s 
aim was to protect its monopoly in the operating systems market (plat-
form) from the threat of middleware such as Sun’s Java technologies and 
Netscape, which could have evolved into a rival platform for applications. 
Microsoft engaged in a strategy of annihilation of that threat,32 through a 
series of measures, such as withholding technical information, contractual 
and design measures, etc. The District of Columbia Circuit unanimously 
affirmed  some  of  Judge  Jackson’s  liability  findings  with  regard  to  IE, 
including most notably monopolization of the OS market for PCs.33 Judge 
Jackson also found liability of tying IE with Windows as a per se tying 
claim, but this was reversed by the District of Columbia Circuit on appeal. 
The US Department of Justice declined to pursue the tying claim under the 
rule of reason approach suggested by the District of Columbia Circuit.
Crucially, however, the District of Columbia Circuit did not address 
the claim that Microsoft withheld valuable technical information from 
Netscape in the liability part of the decision. William Page and Seldon 
Childers note that ‘nothing in the opinion supports the propositions that 
a monopolist has a general obligation to make its products compatible 
with those of its rivals or to help its rivals develop products that can inter-
31  United States v Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
32  87 F.Supp.2d at 46. The District of Columbia Circuit found that the plain-
tiffs did not establish a high probability of success of the attempted monopolization 
claim, in particular, but demonstrated that substantial barriers to entry protected 
that market: United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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operate with its own’.34 Interoperability became, however, an important 
concern in the remedial part of the US Microsoft case. Judge Jackson’s 
2000 remedial order called for a variety of conduct orders, in addition to 
the structural vertical separation of Microsoft, including a requirement 
that Microsoft disclose applications programming interfaces (APIs), com-
munications interfaces and technical information necessary for developers 
to ensure that their software was compatible with Windows and therefore 
to ‘interoperate effectively with Microsoft platform software’.35
The  District  of  Columbia  Circuit  vacated  the  remedial  order  for  a 
number of reasons, including the fact that Judge Jackson failed to offer an 
explanation of how the remedy would restore competitive conditions and 
that, following the reversal of most of the liability holdings, it was neces-
sary to remand the case to the trial court in order to establish appropriate 
remedies. Interestingly, the District of Columbia Circuit linked the design 
of an appropriate remedy with the issue of causation, by mentioning that 
the courts must base their remedies on ‘some clear indication of a signifi-
cant causal connection between the conduct enjoined or mandated and the 
violation found directed toward the remedial goal intended’.36 The remedy 
should also be carefully ‘tailored to fit the wrong creating the occasion 
for the remedy’.37 It is interesting to note that on remand, after a further 
trial, the district court rejected the divestiture remedy for IE and Microsoft 
Office, suggested by the plaintiffs, because ‘(n)either the evidentiary record 
from the liability phase, nor the record in this portion of the proceeding, 
establishes that the present success of IE is attributable entirely, or even in 
predominant part, to Microsoft’s illegal conduct’.38 Following the refer-
ral to the district court, the United States and nine states (the New York 
group) entered a settlement with Microsoft and agreed to a proposed final 
34  William  H.  Page  and  Seldon  J.  Childers,  ‘Software  Development  as  an 
Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications 
Protocol  Licensing  Requirement’  (2007)  14  Michigan  Telecommunications 
and  Technology  Law  Review  77,  86  available  at  www.mttlr.org/volfourteen/
page&childers.pdf.
35  United States v Microsoft Corp., 97 F.Supp.2d 59, 67 (D.D.C. 2000).
36  97 F.Supp.2d at 105. The court also indicated when remanding the case 
to the district court that ‘(i)n devising an appropriate remedy, the District Court 
also should consider whether plaintiffs have established a sufficient causal connec-
tion between Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct and its dominant position in 
the OS market’, the court noting that ‘we have found a causal connection between 
Microsoft’s  exclusionary  conduct  and  its  continuing  position  in  the  operating 
systems market only through inference’.
37  97 F.Supp.2d at 107.
38  New York v Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d 76, 185 n. 81 (D.D.C. 2002).408  Microsoft on trial
judgment. Judge Kollar-  Kotelly reviewed the settlement under the Tunney 
Act in order to determine if it was in the public interest39 and confirmed 
the consent decree with only minor modifications.40 A group of states (the 
California group) pursued a more extensive relief41 but they were finally 
granted a similar relief to the New York group.42 The District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals affirmed both final judgments.43 Judge Kollar-  Kotelly, 
the district court judge, supervised the enforcement of the remedy.
The  District  of  Columbia  District  Court’s  decision  included  some 
‘forward-  looking’  remedies  that  attempted  to  guarantee  a  degree  of 
interoperability  between  Microsoft’s  operating  system  and  middleware 
applications, as well as between Microsoft’s PC operating system products 
and third party server operating systems. It was thought that such interop-
eration ‘will play an integral role in the successful emergence of new soft-
ware products and platforms and that fostering such interoperation is an 
appropriate remedial objective in this case’.44 This remedy was allegedly 
demanded by the states and included in the consent decree without any 
particular thought as to the extent of the obligation imposed on Microsoft 
and the difficulties of its enforcement.45 Middleware was defined more 
broadly than the browser and the Java applications that were the main 
subjects of the decision, and also included WMP, Windows Messenger, 
Outlook Express ‘and their successors in a Windows Operating System 
Product’,46 although it was contended that these ‘forward looking provi-
sions’ aimed to ‘foster competition in the monopolized market in a manner 
39  United States v Microsoft Corp., 215 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002). 
40  U.S. v Microsoft, 231 F. Supp 2d. 144 (D.D.C. 2002)
41  New York v Microsoft Corp., 209 F.Supp.2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002).
42  New  York.  v  Microsoft  Corp.,  224  F.Supp.2d  76  (D.D.C.  2002),  final 
judgment.
43  Massachusetts v Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
44  New York v Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d at 171.
45  As is explained by Page and Childers, n. 34, above, at 97,, the idea of 
requiring Microsoft to disclose protocols for interoperation of server-  based appli-
cations and Windows had arisen during the settlement negotiations mediated by 
Judge Posner and were not mentioned in the liability phase of the decision. The 
negotiations did not focus on the web-  browser as it had become clear by that time 
that Microsoft had won the ‘browser war’. The US Department of Justice and the 
states were instead worried that Microsoft could leverage its monopoly power onto 
the server operating systems market and thus ‘maintain its dominance by retarding 
the ability of non-  Microsoft servers—servers being the vital, digitized, data-  filled 
libraries  that  served  corporate  networks  and  the  Internet—to  hook  onto  PCs 
powered by Windows’.
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consistent with the theory of liability in this case’.47 The consent decree 
required Microsoft to disclose not only APIs that were used by Microsoft 
middleware to interoperate with a Windows operating system product 
in order to place rival middleware suppliers on an equal footing with 
Microsoft in developing applications for Windows, but also ‘any com-
munications protocol’, which is ‘implemented in a Windows Operating 
System Product installed on a client computer’ that is ‘used to interoper-
ate, or communicate natively (i.e., without the addition of software code 
to the client operating system product) with a Microsoft server operating 
system product’.48
Communication protocols constitute the rules for the transmission of 
information  between  servers  and  clients  or  between  servers  and  other 
servers. Communication protocols may ‘perform a function akin to that 
performed by traditional middleware because they provide  a platform 
for applications running “for” use on a PC’, thus enhancing the ability of 
these non-  Microsoft server operating systems to provide a platform which 
competes with Windows itself.49 The district court limited its disclosure 
requirement for protocols that had a sufficient nexus to the theory of the 
liability of the case, maintenance of monopoly: only communication pro-
tocols implemented in a Windows operating system product installed on 
a client (PC) computer used to interoperate or communicate natively with 
the Microsoft server operating system product were covered.50 This fol-
lowed the rejection, by the district court, of the attempt of the plaintiffs to 
link interoperability as a general concept to the findings of liability and, 
consequently, the ‘overbroad’ disclosures that these were requesting. Such 
overbroad disclosure would have led to the cloning of Windows without 
violating Microsoft’s intellectual property rights (IPRs). The court defined 
cloning as ‘the creation of a piece of software which replicates the func-
tions of another piece of software, even if the replication is accomplished 
by some means (e.g. reverse-  engineering) other than the literal repetition 
of the same source code’.51
The  district  court  rejected  the  states’  definition  of  interoperable,  as 
it  equated  this  concept  to  interchangeable.52  That  would  have  denied 
Microsoft  returns  from  its  investment  in  innovation  and  divested 
Microsoft’s IPRs of their value, as well as decreasing the incentives of 
47  224 F.Supp.2d at 193.
48  224 F.Supp.2d, final judgment, part III.E.
49  224 F.Supp.2d at 172–3.
50  224 F.Supp.2d at 173.
51  224 F.Supp.2d at 176.
52  224 F.Supp.2d at 227.410  Microsoft on trial
software developers to innovate since they would have created clones of 
Microsoft’s product.53 The district court assumed that a greater degree 
of interoperability would have increased the risk of cloning and therefore 
led to greater homogeneity in the market. Additional difficulties for an 
extensive disclosure related to the need for Microsoft to maintain product 
flexibility, but again the indirect connection of the interoperability remedy 
with the liability findings in this case limited the court’s activism. The 
district court also rejected the plaintiff’s demand to require Microsoft to 
provide this information without being permitted to charge a reasonable 
royalty in exchange for the licence of its intellectual property.
The State of Massachusetts challenged the remedy decision of the dis-
trict court to the Court of Appeal arguing, among other claims, that the 
district court had imposed a restrictive disclosure obligation on Microsoft. 
With  regard  to  communication  protocols,  it  was  argued  that  native 
interoperability was only one out of five possible approaches to achiev-
ing interoperability between Windows client (PC) operating systems and 
non-  Microsoft server operating systems. The Court of Appeal found that 
complete interoperability would have been imprudent and that the objec-
tive of the court should be to ‘advance the ability of non-  Microsoft server 
operating systems to serve as platforms for applications’, in conformity 
with the liability theory of the case.54 The court ruled that ‘full’ or ‘seam-
less’ interoperability was not appropriate in this case. Pursuant to section 
III.E of the remedies judgment, Microsoft put in place a protocol licensing 
programme in September 2002.55
The EC case    The broader scope of the consumer harm theory followed 
in the EC Microsoft case had an impact on the degree of interoperability 
required. Contrary to the US Microsoft case, the leveraging of Microsoft’s 
quasi-  monopoly power in the Windows operating system (platform) to 
the applications was the principal theory of harm in the EC Microsoft 
case. The two forms of conduct sanctioned by the European Commission, 
refusal to interoperate and tying, were intrinsically linked to this specific 
theory of consumer harm. Certainly, defensive leveraging was mentioned 
as an additional concern but the core of the case was leveraging.56 It was 
thus possible for the Commission to impose stricter and more extensive 
53  224 F.Supp.2d.
54  Massachusetts v Microsoft Corp, 373 F.3d at 1224.
55  For  additional  information  on  the  monitoring  process  of  the  protocol 
licensing programme, see the Joint Status Reports on Microsoft’s Compliance 
with the Final Judgment, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm.
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requirements on Microsoft. Furthermore, contrary to the US case, the 
existence of consumer harm was not inferred by the possibility of mid-
dleware to operate as a competing platform to Windows in the future. 
There was some evidence in the Decision that supported the contention 
that consumers were harmed by the exclusion of competing work group 
servers, as it was ‘diminishing consumers’ choices by locking them into a 
homogenous Microsoft solution’.57 This causal link between the theory of 
harm and the anti-  competitive practice can be explained by the emphasis 
put in EC competition law on the special responsibility of dominant firms 
to preserve competition58 and the importance the Commission gave to 
network effects as significant barriers to entry reducing the contestability 
of the operating systems and the work group server markets.59
Sun was therefore able to extend the interoperability requirement to 
server-  to-  server communication protocols that were non-  native. According 
to the Commission, this was linked to the perception that compatibility 
should  extend  beyond  the  Windows  domain  architecture  or  computer 
system as, in order to benefit from the upgrade from Windows to Windows 
2000 and profit from the advanced features of the Windows 2000 domain, 
the work group servers should be Windows 2000-  compatible.60 This was 
possible partly because Microsoft had integrated Active Directory support 
directly into the Windows server which guaranteed interoperability ‘within 
a computer system encompassing several Windows client PCs and several 
Windows  work  group  servers  linked  together  in  a  network’,  therefore 
implying ‘both client-  to-  server and server to-  server interoperability’ in a 
seamless way.61 As the Commission noted in the Decision:
57  Decision, para. 782.
58  Case C-  322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission 
[1983] ECR 3461 (‘Michelin I’), para. 57; CFI judgment, para. 775; Case T-  203/01 
Michelin  v  Commission  [2003]  ECR  II-  4071  (Michelin  II),  para.  97.  See  also, 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-  95/04 P British Airways plc v 
Commission [2007] ECR I-  2331, para. 23: ‘(w)ithin the scope of the application 
of Article 82 EC, a dominant undertaking is subject to certain limitations that 
do not apply to other undertakings in the same form. Because of the presence of 
the dominant undertaking, competition on the market in question is weakened. 
Therefore – whatever the causes of its dominant position – that undertaking has 
a particular responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not undermine effective 
and undistorted competition in the common market. A practice which would be 
unobjectionable under normal circumstances can be an abuse if applied by an 
undertaking in a dominant position’.
59  Decision, para. 448.
60  Decision, para. 169.
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The common ability to be part of that architecture is an element of compatibility 
between Windows client PCs and Windows work group servers. This compat-
ibility can be described in terms of interoperability with the Windows domain 
architecture.62
The Commission found that the degree of interoperability of a non-
  Microsoft work group server affects the ‘efficiency with which that work 
group server delivers its services to the users of the network’, as ‘other 
work group server operating system vendors that want to compete for cus-
tomers having an existing investment in Windows need access to informa-
tion relating to interoperability with the Windows domain architecture’.63 
Sun was indeed requesting Microsoft to provide full (native) interoper-
ability information for its server Solaris, including server-  to-  server native 
interoperability, the type and degree of interoperability that was explicitly 
rejected by Judge Kollar-  Kottely in the US Microsoft case. Sun requested 
specifications that would enable the company to implement in its products 
this ability for native interoperability. In comparison, the fact that this 
information was proprietary was mentioned in the US case as a factor 
limiting disclosure.
The scope of the interoperability requirement was also broader than 
in the US case. The US Microsoft Communications Protocols Licensing 
programme  was  limited  to  client-  server  communication64  but  did  not 
extend to the interoperability between server-  to-  server protocols that are 
functionally related to the client PC, as was requested in the Commission’s 
Decision.65  Other  interoperability  solutions  were  not  considered  to  be 
equivalent. The interoperability requirement imposed by the Commission 
was  not  open-  ended,  however,  but  concerned  precisely  the  core  work 
group server tasks of file, print and group and user administration, which 
were essential for rivals to compete in the work group server operating 
systems market.66 The refusal that was at stake in the Decision was that 
to provide a full specification of the protocols underlying the Windows 
domain architecture, which organizes the way in which Windows work 
group servers deliver work group server services to Windows client PCs.67 
The Commission insisted that while Sun’s requests involved both client-
62  Decision, para. 182.
63  Decision, paras 183–4.
64  Microsoft’s Communications Protocol License Agreements, section 2.2.(e) 
License Scope,
Reservation of Rights. Available at www.microsoft.com/protocols/mcpp.mspx. 
65  Decision, paras 287, 289, 688–91.
66  Decision, para. 566.
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  to-  server and server-  to-  server interoperability, the latter interconnections 
and interactions were functionally related to the client PC, noting that ‘the 
link back to the client PC operating system market implies that the com-
petitive value of the information refused derives from Microsoft’s market 
strength in the client PC operating system market’, thus building the nec-
essary causal link between the dominant position and the abuse.68
The Commission found that Microsoft’s refusal to supply full specifica-
tion of the protocols used by Windows work group servers to deliver work 
group server services to Windows group networks aimed to allow the use 
of  that  specification  to  build  interoperable  products  and  distinguished 
that from the implementation of these specifications, which were not to be 
disclosed.69 The Commission noted that it was common industry prac-
tice to provide interface specifications without giving access to all imple-
mentation details (e.g. standard–setting organizations on best practices in 
software specification).70
Microsoft’s  work  group  server  operating  system  products  had  also 
enjoyed  a  rapid  rise  to  dominance  in  the  market.71  The  Commission 
linked Microsoft’s growth to the launch of Microsoft’s Windows 2000 
generation  of  products,  for  which  Microsoft  had  disclosed  less  inter-
operability  information  than  for  previous  generations.72  Microsoft’s 
competitors have been unsuccessful in challenging Microsoft’s position: 
Novell’s  market  shares  decreased  considerably  and  Linux  and  UNIX 
products  had  only  a  marginal  presence  in  the  market73  and  did  not 
represent a significant threat to Microsoft. The lack of interoperability 
locked-  in customers in a ‘homogeneous Windows solution for work group 
networks’.74 According to the Commission, which based its findings on 
consumer surveys, interoperability was ‘the key factor driving the uptake 
of Microsoft’s work group server operating systems’.75 The Commission 
68  Decision, para. 567.
69  Decision, para. 570. ‘The specification is descriptive in nature and describes 
what an implementation must achieve, not how it achieves it. The implementation 
is, on the contrary, algorithmic as it has to provide a process or set of rules to be 
followed in calculations or problem-  solving operations that will run on a compu-
ter’: Decision, para. 65. In other words, contrary to implementations, specifica-
tions do not have to be executable (run on a computer).
70  Decision, para. 571.
71  Decision, para. 590.
72  Decision, para. 592.
73  Decision, para. 597.
74  Decision, para 613.
75  Decision, paras 637, 665. It is not entirely clear, however, if the specific 
consumer surveys were as conclusive as the Commission concludes in the Decision. 414  Microsoft on trial
emphasized server to server interoperability as it viewed client-  to-  server 
and server-  to-  server interoperability as ‘tightly linked to one another’,76 
a consequence of the new integrated architecture of Windows to function 
as a system.77 As long as server-  to-  server communication was necessary 
in  order  to  perform  a  server-  to-  client  communication,  Microsoft  had 
to provide specifications for these communication protocols in order to 
enable Novell’s products to compete.
The linkage with the quasi-  monopolistic position of Microsoft on the 
client PC operating systems market is more indirect and in essence weaker 
than  in  the  case  of  server-  to-  client  communications.  The  Commission 
found nevertheless that server-  to-  server interoperability was an ‘indispen-
sable input’ for Microsoft’s competitors to be able to compete and did not 
distinguish between the different degrees of indispensability of a server-  to-
  client or server-  to-  server interoperability and the various degrees of inter-
operability that could have influenced the remedy imposed. Additionally, 
the Commission did not clearly show that the high degree of interoper-
ability  among  servers  that  it  demanded  was  sufficiently  influenced  by 
Microsoft’s dominant position as regards Windows clients.
Microsoft’s conduct was found to produce consumer harm: first, con-
sumer harm came in the form of reduced consumer choice as non-  disclosure 
would  have  eliminated  or  marginalized  products  that  could  provide 
interoperability in ‘heterogeneous computing environments’;78 secondly, 
Microsoft has been able to impair ‘the effective competitive structure in 
the market’ by gaining a dominant position in the market for work group 
server operating systems.79 The Commission did not believe that enhanced 
interoperability would lead to cloning.80 The definition of cloning by the 
Commission  was  not,  however,  similar  to  the  definition  of  cloning  in 
Footnote 75 (cont.)
The surveys did not fully assess the value that consumers would place on inter-
operability compared to other features of Microsoft and non-  Microsoft servers. 
Additionally, it is unclear whether the surveys were filled only by server buyers in 
the relevant antitrust market as defined by the Commission.
76  Decision, para. 689.
77  The Commission noted that ‘the proper functioning of a Windows work 
group network relies on an architecture of client-  to-  server and server-  to-  server 
interconnections and interactions, which ensures a transparent access to the core 
work group server services’, known as ‘Active Directory domain architecture’.
78  Decision, para. 703. Locking-  in consumers into a homogenous Microsoft 
solution and therefore diminishing consumer choice indicated, according to the 
Commission, the existence of important consumer harm. Decision, para. 782.
79  Decision, para. 704.
80  Decision, paras 713–29.  Quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases    415
the US case given by Judge Kollar-  Kotelly, for whom cloning was pre-
cisely  what  the  European  Commission  called  functional  equivalence.81 
The Commission rejected the definition of cloning as functional equiva-
lence and implied that cloning would exist only if Sun was authorized to 
copy Microsoft’s source code.82 The existence of functional equivalence 
would not lead to a similar product, as the Commission assumed that 
‘Microsoft’s competitors will have to provide additional value to the cus-
tomer, beyond mere interoperability of their products with the Windows 
domain architecture, if such products are to be commercially viable’.83 The 
Commission found that there was no qualitative difference, from the point 
of view of innovation, between the protocols on client-  to-  server commu-
nication that it had agreed to provide under the US consent decree with 
the Communications Protocols Licensing programme, and the protocols 
required for server-  to-  server interoperability, as these ‘involve the same 
type of protocols—sometimes the very same protocols’ and that therefore 
any disclosure would not affect Microsoft’s incentives to innovate.84
Microsoft was ordered ‘to disclose complete and accurate specifications 
for the protocols used by Windows work group servers in order to provide 
file, print and group and user administration services to Windows work 
group networks’85 as well as to authorize the implementation of these 
specifications in work group server operating system products.86 As it was 
previously noted, this disclosure covered ‘both direct interconnection and 
interaction between a Windows work group server and a Windows client 
PC, as well as interconnection and interaction between a Windows work 
group server and a Windows client PC that is indirect and passes through 
another  Windows  work  group  server’.87  It  also  applied  prospectively 
81  New York v Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d at 175–6, cited by William H. 
Page, Mandatory Contracting Remedies in the American and European Microsoft 
Cases, University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-  22 
(5 May 2009), pp. 29–30, available at SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073103. 
According to Judge Kollar-  Kotelly, ‘the clone emerges from a process of reverse 
engineering, which consists of the study of functionality in the original product and 
the attempt to produce a product which accomplishes the same end. The process 
of cloning the functionality of a competitor’s product is usually an expensive and 
time-  consuming undertaking which, if successful, will enable the cloned product to 
function as a replacement for the original product’.
82  Decision, paras 718–19.
83  Decision, para. 722.
84  Decision, para. 728.
85  Decision, para. 999.
86  Decision, para. 1003.
87  Decision, para. 1003.416  Microsoft on trial
to future generations of Microsoft’s products, implying that Microsoft 
should update the disclosed information, each time it brought to market 
new versions of its products.88 The aim set for the remedy was ‘to ensure 
that Microsoft’s competitors can develop products that interoperate with 
the  Windows  domain  architecture  natively  supported  in  the  dominant 
Windows  client  PC  operating  system  and  hence  viably  compete  with 
Microsoft’s work group server operating system’.89 The disclosure did not 
cover the source code but the Commission also added that ‘to the extent 
that this Decision might require Microsoft to refrain from fully enforcing 
any of its intellectual property rights, this would be justified by the need to 
put an end to the abuse’.90
Article 5 of the Decision required that any disclosure should be made on 
‘reasonable and non discriminatory terms’. This implied: first, that ‘the dis-
closures should be made to any undertaking having an interest in offering 
work group server operating system products’ and in a timely manner;91 
secondly, that any remuneration that Microsoft might charge for supply 
should not reflect the strategic value stemming from Microsoft’s market 
power in the client PC operating system market or in the work group 
server operating system market, allowing its recipients to ‘viably compete 
with Microsoft’s work group server operating system’;92 and thirdly, that 
the terms ‘under which they can make use of the disclosed specifications 
will remain reasonably stable’.93 We will examine in a subsequent section 
how these conditions, in particular the second one, led to substantive liti-
gation. However, it was the design of an implementation mechanism for 
the remedies that raised the most important difficulties.
Difficulties of the Implementation Mechanism
The period after the European Commission’s decision: slow progress    Article 
7  of  the  Commission’s  liability  Decision  required  from  Microsoft  to 
submit a proposal to the Commission ‘for the establishment of a suit-
able  mechanism  assisting  the  Commission  in  monitoring  Microsoft 
Corporation’s compliance’. The Commission retained the right to impose 
such a mechanism by Decision, if Microsoft’s proposal was not found 
‘suitable’. The Commission followed the example of the US Microsoft 
88  Decision, para. 1002.
89  Decision, para. 1003.
90  Decision, para. 1004.
91  Decision, para. 1006.
92  Decision, para. 1008(ii).
93  Decision, para. 1008(iv).  Quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases    417
antitrust case, where a technical committee was appointed with the aim 
to  ensure  compliance,  thus  rejecting  the  option  of  a  simple  reporting 
mechanism. The complexity of the Decision, and in particular the need to 
constantly verify the accuracy and completeness of the information pro-
vided by Microsoft, as well as the need to provide adequate information 
on  specifications,  would  have  indeed  required,  in  some  circumstances, 
the inspection of Microsoft’s source code in order to resolve any issue of 
accuracy and completeness of the specifications disclosed, thus requiring 
a  more  institutionalized  structure,  such  as  a  Monitoring  Trustee.  The 
Monitoring Trustee was urged to adopt a proactive, rather than reactive, 
role in enforcing the interoperability, as well as the tying, part of the 
Decision.
Microsoft  was  required  to  propose  a  mandate  for  the  Monitoring 
Trustee.  This  mandate  was  subject  to  a  number  of  principles,  among 
others, the designation of the Monitoring Trustee by the Commission, 
the independence of the Trustee from Microsoft, the guarantee that ‘the 
Monitoring Trustee would have access to Microsoft’s assistance, informa-
tion, documents, premises and employees to the extent that he may rea-
sonably require such access in carrying out his mandate’ and ‘full access 
to the source code of the relevant Microsoft products’.94 The Monitoring 
Trustee had the possibility to hire experts to carry out certain precisely 
defined tasks on his behalf and it was specified that all costs of establish-
ment of the Monitoring Trustee, including a fair remuneration, should be 
borne by Microsoft.95
Microsoft submitted the first proposal for the establishment of a moni-
toring mechanism in April 2004 and followed up with the submission of 
two draft agreements that it intended to offer as part of a Work Group 
Server Protocol programme (the 2004 WSPP agreement).96 The experi-
ence  of  the  US  Communications  Protocol  programme  (MCPP)97  and 
94  Decision, para. 1048.
95  Decision, para. 1048(v).
96  These  included  the  licence  agreement  that  Microsoft  ‘planned  to  use  in 
order to make available the intellectual property in its protocols’ (‘the 2004 WSPP 
Development and Distribution Agreement’), and ‘a draft form of evaluation agree-
ment that Microsoft planned to use in order to enable prospective licensees to evalu-
ate the protocols we would be making available before entering into a license for such 
protocols’ (‘the 2004 WSPP Evaluation Agreement’). For a corporate description 
of Microsoft’s Intellectual Property Licensing programme, see Eve Psalti and Keith 
Hageman, ‘Microsoft’s Intellectual Property Licensing Program Boosts Customer 
Choice’,  available  at  http://download.microsoft.com/download/3/a/6/3a601f1b-
  ab32-  486b-  83de-  dff660162125/MPP_IP_White_Paper.pdf.
97  See www.microsoft.com/protocols/mcpp.mspx. 418  Microsoft on trial
the monitoring of the remedy by the US Technical Committee were, in a 
way, instructive of the difficulties the implementation of the Commission 
Decision would also face.98
Most difficulties related, as in the US case, to the scope and the quality 
of the documentation provided by Microsoft in order to fully comply with 
the Decision. William Page and Seldon Childers detail the compliance 
efforts undertaken by Microsoft and the Technical Committee in the US 
Microsoft case as an ongoing project readjusted according to the market 
results it was achieving: these were not those anticipated, as after the first 
year of the programme and the initial release of the documentation, only 
four companies had agreed to a MCPP licence.99 Under the instigation 
of the monitoring Judge Kollar-  Kotelly, Microsoft was required to make 
significant changes to the MCPP licences, to reduce the royalties required 
and to perform a number of promotional activities in order to attract new 
licensees.100 The Technical Committee had also extended the degree of 
disclosure of the protocols by requiring Microsoft to show licensees how 
to use the protocols and created ‘an ancillary software development that 
would field test the protocols in order to check if the information pro-
vided by Microsoft would enable the Technical Committee’s engineers to 
write implementations; this amounted to test Microsoft’s compliance by 
using the information provided’.101 Microsoft went as far as to create an 
‘interoperability lab’, in order to test MCPP protocol implementations for 
MCPP licensees and to offer ‘direct access to Microsoft product develop-
ment  teams  and  in-  person  support  from  experienced  engineering  staff  
during testing’.102 As it is reported by Page and Childers, ‘these efforts led 
to substantial increases in staffing for both Microsoft and the Technical 
Committee’, as more than 210 Microsoft employees and 40 Committee 
staff were involved in the operation.103
The ‘one at a time’ method of fixing problems in the communication 
of the protocols was replaced in 2006 by a more comprehensive approach 
and a ‘new overarching specification’ for the technical documentation, 
put under the supervision of Robert Muglia, an experienced Microsoft 
executive. This new programme was based on ‘the specification agreed 
198  For an excellent account, see William H. Page and Seldon J. Childers, n 34 
above, 108.
199  Page and Childers, n. 34 above, 114. To date, only SAMBA has worked in 
any significant way with the information provided through the MCPP licence.
100  Page and Childers, n. 34 above.
101  Page and Childers, n. 34 above, 117.
102  See www.microsoft.com/protocols/mcpp.mspx.
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upon  between  Microsoft  and  the  European  Monitoring  Trustee’.104 
According to Page and Childers, this new specification was the result 
of  a  formal  collaboration  between  the  Technical  Committee  and  the 
European Commission’s Monitoring Trustee and involved the rewrit-
ing  of  the  technical  documentation,  ‘eventually  replacing  the  bulk  of 
the work performed to date, while incorporating everything Microsoft 
has learned while trying to meet the prior standards, as well as comple-
mentary requirements from the EU documentation standards’.105 The 
importance of this project required the extension of the programme until 
November 2009, with a further possibility of extension until November 
2012.106
The European Commission’s Decision had the advantage of intervening 
at a later stage when the US experience could have been very instructive 
for the design of the interoperability remedy. It also requested, however, 
disclosure of information that was never before the subject of a disclosure 
programme. The result of the Commission’s Decision was therefore not 
only to oblige Microsoft to adopt the Work Group Server Protocol pro-
gramme, but also to extend the scope of the US MCPP to the extent that 
this would have made possible compliance with both US and EC require-
ments. It is clear that in a global market where products are marketed at 
the global level, it is very difficult and costly to maintain two different com-
pliance or communications protocols programmes: the programme that 
imposes the strictest disclosure obligations ends up setting the   standard of 
disclosure.
Microsoft lodged an application for suspension of the Decision with the 
CFI107 and also applied for an annulment of the Commission’s Decision.108 
However, it decided on its own initiative not to enforce articles 5(a), 5(b), 
5(c), 5(e), 6(a) and 6(b) of the Decision, pending the outcome of the interim 
measures proceedings before the CFI. The President of the CFI rejected 
104  Joint Status Report on Microsoft’s Compliance with the Final Judgments, 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-  1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. 30 August 2006) 
(hereinafter  ‘JSR  August  2006’),  at  3,  available  at  www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f218000/218096.pdf.
105  Page and Childers, n. 34 above, 122.
106  Joint  Status  Report  on  Microsoft’s  Compliance  with  the  Final 
Judgments US v. Microsoft, 22 April 2009, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f244900/244920.htm.
107  Application for Suspension of the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 
(COMP/C-  3/37.792 Microsoft), Case T-  201/04 R Microsoft v Commission [2004] 
ECR II-  4463.
108  See CFI judgment.420  Microsoft on trial
Microsoft’s  application  for  a  suspension  order  in  December  2004.109 
Following an exchange of views between Microsoft and the European 
Commission  on  different  draft  decisions,  the  Commission  adopted  a 
Decision in July 2005, setting a detailed framework for the Monitoring 
Trustee’s  functions,  determining  the  procedure  of  appointment  of  the 
trustee and describing the rights and obligations of each party.110 The 
Commission appointed as Monitoring Trustee, Professor Neil Barrett, a 
computer scientist, from a shortlist of four experts submitted by Microsoft 
in  October  2005.111  In  the  meantime,  the  European  Commission  had 
received from Microsoft a proposal on the technical documentation to be 
disclosed, as well as suggestions as to the non-  discriminatory and reason-
able conditions under which the information would be disclosed.112
The compliance process for the interoperability part of the Decision 
faced  two  difficulties  that  led  to  a  number  of  exchanges  between  the 
Commission  and  Microsoft  and  eventually  a  number  of  penalty  deci-
sions under Article 24 of Regulation 1/2003.113 The first series of diffi-
culties concerned the extent to which Microsoft provided the European 
Commission with complete and accurate technical documentation. There 
is an inherent ambiguity in this kind of exercise. Since the subject matter 
was intensely technical, it was hard for the lawyers on each side to com-
municate effectively with one another and to find a consensus on which 
aspects of Windows the Commission wanted Microsoft to document and 
share  with  competitors.  The  second  series  of  difficulties  related  to  the 
imposition of reasonable and non-  discriminatory terms, and in particular 
the   establishment of royalties for the WSPP licences.
OTR, the external technical experts of the Commission prior to the 
appointment  of  the  Monitoring  Trustee,  found  the  proposals  sent  by 
Microsoft to be insufficiently complete, in particular as there was missing 
information and a lack of introductory and explanatory materials, making 
the technical information virtually unusable for developers without prior 
knowledge of the Microsoft environment. The Commission found that the 
WSPP remuneration scheme also presented several problems as it did not 
109  Case T-  201/04R Microsoft v Commission.
110  See Decision. 
111  IP/05/1215.
112  IP/05/673.
113  Article 24 of Regulation 1/2003 entitles the Commission to impose such 
penalty payments not exceeding 5 per cent of average daily turnover in the preced-
ing business year per calendar day to compel companies to put an end to infringe-
ments of EC Treaty antitrust rules, where an infringement has been established by 
a previous Commission antitrust Decision.  Quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases    421
comply with the three conditions for the remuneration to be declared rea-
sonable and non-  discriminatory: i.e. that the protocols were Microsoft’s 
own creation, the protocols were innovative, and the remuneration should 
be in line with a market valuation for technologies deemed comparable to 
any innovations identified by Microsoft.
Microsoft  was  indeed  offering  two  separate  licensing  agreements  to 
companies: a ‘No-  Patent Agreement’, which allowed licensees to use the 
protocols without taking a licence for some disputed (by third parties) 
patents  that  Microsoft  considered  as  being  necessary,  and  an  ‘All  IP 
Agreement’ which included a patent licence for these disputed patents. For 
both licensees, Microsoft divided the protocols into Gold, Silver, Bronze 
price categories, from the most to the least innovative information or not 
necessarily innovative category, for which Microsoft imposed no royalty. 
The Commission found that the WSPP agreements offered by Microsoft 
were lacking in all three conditions.114
In light of these failings, the Commission issued a Decision in November 
2005  pursuant  to  Article  24(1)  of  Regulation  1/2003  which  warned 
Microsoft that if it did not comply with its obligations to supply complete 
and accurate information and to make the information available on rea-
sonable terms, it would face a daily fine of up to €2,000,000.115
Following this Article 24(1) Decision, Microsoft provided, some days 
after the expiry of the deadline, a new version of technical documents and 
announced in January 2005 that it was offering a source code licence to all 
potential licensees. The Commission found that this documentation was 
not ‘substantially different’ from the earlier documentation and did not 
seem impressed by the source code announcements as this did not necessar-
ily respond to the need to provide some active support to third party devel-
opers if these were to understand the specifications described by Microsoft 
114  In particular, the Commission noted that Microsoft’s maximum royalty 
pricing levels would place the potential recipient of the interoperability informa-
tion at a significant competitive disadvantage vis-  á-  vis Microsoft ‘if the royalty 
that it has to pay is the same as the stand-  alone price of Microsoft’s work group 
server operating system product’ (Decision, para. 118) and that even the minimum 
pricing levels would create ‘a significant constraint on the ability of the work group 
server operating system vendor to compete if the cost of interoperating (which is 
necessary to be able to viably compete) is one fifth of the value of the dominant 
vendor’s entire work group server operating system product’ (Decision, para. 120). 
This issue is reminiscent of a margin squeeze claim.
115  Commission  Decision  imposing  a  periodic  penalty  payment  pursuant 
to Article 24(1), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/deci-
sions/37792/art24_1_decision.pdf.422  Microsoft on trial
in the technical documentation provided.116 Following consultation with 
the Advisory Committee of Member State Competition Authorities,117 
and  supporting  reports  from  the  Monitoring  Trustee  and  other  exter-
nal consultants, the Commission sent a new Statement of Objection for 
non-  compliance  with  the  obligation  to  provide  complete  and  accurate 
technical documentation (the first step in an Article 24(1) Decision),118 
and later issued a decision for non-  compliance pursuant to Article 24(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003 imposing on Microsoft a further €2.8 billion for contin-
ued non-  compliance with the March 2004 Decision and (this time acting 
on the basis of Article 24(1)) raised the periodic penalties to €3,000,000 
for  non-  compliance.119  Microsoft  introduced  an  action  for  annulment 
of this decision at the CFI in October 2006, requesting the annulment or 
  reduction of the amount of the periodic penalty imposed.120
But  this  was  not  the  end  of  Microsoft’s  troubles.  The  Commission 
had raised in the first Article 24(2) Decision the possibility of also fixing 
periodic penalty payments for non-  compliance with the second aspect of 
the Decision: charging reasonable remuneration for access to or use of 
the interoperability information. Both the Monitoring Trustee and the 
Commission’s external advisor submitted reports which concluded that 
the remuneration levels proposed by Microsoft as a starting point for 
negotiation  with  licensees  were  not  reasonable.121  Following  this  con-
sultation, the Commission sent Microsoft a Statement of Objection on 
1 March 2007 indicating that there was no significant innovation in the 
interoperability information and concluded that the prices suggested by 
Microsoft were unreasonable.122 In response, Microsoft submitted revised 
116  MEMO/06/76.
117  2008/C 138/04 [2008] OJ C138/3.
118  IP/06/298.
119  Commission Decision fixing the definitive amount of the periodic penalty 
payment  of  12  July  2006,  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
cases/decisions/37792/art24_2_decision.pdf; Summary of Commission Decision, 12 
July 2006, Case COMP/C-  3/37.792 Microsoft [2008] OJ C138/1. According to Article 
24(2) of Regulation 1/2003, ‘(w)here the undertakings or associations of undertak-
ings have satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended 
to enforce, the Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty 
payment at a figure lower than that which would arise under the original decision’.
120  Case T-  271/06 Microsoft v Commission, later removed from the register of 
the Court as Microsoft decided to discontinue the proceedings.
121  For a more detailed description, see Final Report of the Hearing Officer in 
Case COMP/C-  3/37.792 Microsoft, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/ho_report_2008.pdf. 
122  IP/07/269.  The  Commission  found  that,  regarding  the  ‘No-  Patents 
Agreement’,  there  was  no  innovation  in  any  protocol  in  the  Gold  and  Silver   Quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases    423
WSPP agreements that included a revised royalty table providing for a 
new   remuneration scheme, to be assessed by the Commission.
The period after the CFI’s judgment: acceleration    At this stage of the 
proceedings, the CFI rendered its judgment, which annulled Article 7 of 
the Decision in so far as it ordered Microsoft to submit a proposal for the 
establishment of a mechanism involving a Monitoring Trustee independ-
ent from the Commission.123 The Commission asked Microsoft to provide 
all documents and information Microsoft had provided to the Trustee 
or his team to the Commission from the date of the appointment of the 
Trustee.124 The judgment of the Court on the liability issue strengthened 
the  Commission’s  position  in  the  negotiation  process  and  finished  by 
convincing Microsoft to agree to alter a certain number of the conditions 
in the WSPP licence regarding the provision of interoperability informa-
tion (‘the Neelie Kroes-  Steve Ballmer agreement’).125 These included the 
alteration of the terms of the licence in order to render it compatible with 
the open source software model, the reduction of the royalty to a flat fee 
of €10,000 and the reduction of royalties for a worldwide licence including 
patents from 5.95 per cent to 0.4 per cent. The initial royalty claimed by 
Microsoft was of the range of 7 per cent. In comparison, the royalty rates 
of the standard MCPP agreement between Microsoft and the US govern-
ment were 4 per cent of the net revenue of the licensee.126 This figure was 
modified as a consequence of the European Decision and it is now 0.4 per 
cent.127
More concretely, Microsoft will now offer two agreements: a ‘No-  Patent 
Agreement’ which would allow access to the interoperability information, 
categories and that only four minor Bronze protocols represented a limited degree 
of innovation. As regards the ‘All IP Agreement’ category, the Commission also 
found that these were unreasonable, but this time not because of the absence of 
innovation, as the Commission indicated that the existence of patents indicates the 
existence of innovation, although it is possible to challenge the patents or to imple-
ment software which, in their view, does not infringe the patented technology. 
123  See our analysis below.
124  Final Report of the Hearing Officer, at 5, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/ho_report_2008.pdf.
125  William H. Page and Seldon J. Childers, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-  SAMBA Protocol License’ (2008) 
102 Northwestern University Law Review 332.
126  See Commission Decision C(2008)764 final fixing the definitive amount of 
the periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft, para. 246, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/decision2008.pdf.
127  See www.microsoft.com/interop/FAQ.aspx.424  Microsoft on trial
but without taking a licence for patents which Microsoft claims neces-
sary, with the flat royalty fee, and a ‘Patent Agreement’ for patents which 
Microsoft considers relevant, where the royalty fee would be limited to 0.4 
per cent of licensees’ product revenues.128 In addition to these two licences, 
Microsoft took an ‘irrevocable pledge not to sue open source developers 
(whether they are individuals, nonprofit organizations or commercial enti-
ties, such as companies and their employees, working in an open source 
development project) for development and noncommercial distribution of 
implementations of these Open Protocols’.129
The Neelie Kroes-  Steve Ballmer agreement was not greeted overwhelm-
ingly by the members of the open source software community,130 essentially 
for two reasons: first, ‘the terms were still incompatible with the GPLv3 
(General Public License),131 the standard open source license employed by 
open source software’,132 and secondly, the €10,000 flat royalty fee could 
‘discourage use by small free and open source development teams, which 
typically have no operating budget’.133
It had nevertheless a direct impact on the marketplace, as the Commission 
supported  in  December  2007  the  conclusion  of  a  licensing  agreement 
between Microsoft and Samba (‘the PFIF agreement’)134 for the covered 
protocols.  Samba  is  an  open  source/free  software  package  that  gives 
administrators flexibility and freedom in terms of set-  up, configuration 
and choice of systems and equipment for work group servers and which 
provides interoperability to a number of platforms, such as UNIX, Linux, 
IBM System 390, Open VMS and other operating systems. The involve-
ment of Samba in the EC Microsoft litigation has been well explained 
elsewhere,135 but it is interesting here to note the following points: Samba 
decided to intervene in 2003, when its existence was portrayed by Microsoft 
as a proof that there was no need to provide interoperability information 
to competitors and that reverse-  engineering techniques were already in 
128  IP/07/1567.
129  Page and Childers, n. 125 above, 343.
130  See www.samba.org/samba/PFIF/PFIF_history.html at 6.
131  See www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html. 
132  An important characteristic of Samba is that it is free and that it offers, 
according to GPL, permissive licensing terms, the possibility to change Samba soft-
ware, which is available to download for free from the Samba website, and a copy-
right licence that requires derived works to be available under the same copyright.
133  Page and Childers, n. 125 above, 344.
134  The Protocol Freedom Information Foundation Agreement. PFIF was a 
non-  profit corporation created by the Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC) in 
order to license the documentation to free or open source developers.
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use and sufficient.136 Samba’s role became more prominent when the com-
panies that initiated the complaint, in particular Sun and Novell, settled 
the case with Microsoft. This prevented these companies from playing 
an active part at the appeal stage and therefore sharing their important 
technical experience with the Commission and the Monitoring Trustee. 
The SFLC (representing SAMBA) had stepped into the procedure as an 
intervener in order to provide the Commission with technical support if 
needed in the appeal, and a SFLC representative participated to the CFI’s 
hearings. Samba’s role in the litigation became particularly prominent as it 
is now ‘the most important non-  Microsoft technology in the server market 
. . . which emulates the behavior of Windows server products, but runs 
on Linux’ and ‘the de facto standard for most non-  Microsoft network 
enabled products’ used by work group server companies such as IBM, 
Apple, Sun and Novell for their engines.137
The licence agreement between Samba and Microsoft was made pos-
sible with the mediation of the European Monitoring Trustee, who was 
still in place at the time, as the Commission had not formally repealed 
article 7 of the 2004 Commission Decision.138 The Monitoring Trustee 
put Samba’s and Microsoft’s engineers directly in contact to try and fix 
the most problematic parts of the agreement. In particular, Microsoft was 
willing to provide, as an annex to the agreement, an indication of all the 
patents it claimed in its licensed information and agreed not to sue Samba 
for infringement of an unlisted patent.139 These ‘patent maps’, which have 
also become a prominent feature of Microsoft’s interoperability policy,140 
provide developers with an opportunity to attempt to successfully design 
around  Windows,  without  risk  of  patent  infringement.  Microsoft  has 
only included patents on the patent map that it believes are necessar-
ily infringed by any implementation of the protocol. The Samba licence 
constitutes by far the most important development of the EC Microsoft 
Decision’s remedial phase.
In  February  2008,  the  Commission  adopted  a  second  Article  24(2) 
Decision which imposed an additional €899,000,000 penalty for charg-
ing unreasonable prices for access to interface documentation for work 
group servers.141 The Decision made clear that in order to be reasonable 
136  Decision, paras 293–7. The Commission rejected this argument as Samba 
could not function as an Active Directory primary domain controller.
137  Page and Childers, n. 125 above, 335, 336.
138  See www.samba.org/samba/PFIF/PFIF_history.html, at 6.
139  Page and Childers, n. 125 above, 347.
140  See www.microsoft.com/protocols/default.mspx#patent%20maps.
141  Decision C(2008)764, n. 126 above.426  Microsoft on trial
the remuneration charged by Microsoft should exclude the strategic value 
stemming from Microsoft’s market power in the client PC and work group 
server operating systems markets.142 The Commission decided that the 
WSPP pricing principles to which Microsoft had agreed could serve as a 
point of reference for the assessment of the reasonableness of the prices. In 
particular, the Commission assessed the innovative character of the inter-
operability information provided by Microsoft, which forms the second 
WSPP pricing principles criterion, by examining the prior art for each 
claimed specification, and arrived at the conclusion that a very large part 
of the unpatented information (merely trade secrets) lacked innovation.143 
The Commission referred to the usual criteria of patentability (novelty, 
non-  obviousness) in order to define the innovative nature of the informa-
tion as ‘an operational proxy’, mainly for the reason that these are ‘settled 
concepts’ in the area of intellectual property.144
An action for annulment against this Decision was brought at the CFI, 
arguing, among other pleas, that the Commission committed a manifest 
error of assessment ‘by requiring Microsoft to establish that trade secrets 
were innovative under a heightened patentability test in order to justify 
the  imposition  of  royalties  for  a  license  to  such  trade  secrets’.145  The 
Commission then examined the third condition for the remuneration to 
be declared reasonable and non-  discriminatory. It noted that Microsoft 
had provided similar technical documentation of protocols royalty-  free 
in the past, a conduct that it discontinued when it acquired a dominant 
position in the work group server operating systems market; that the roy-
alties charged in the MCPP licence agreements should not be considered 
as concrete evidence of market valuation, in particular as they did not 
bring the requisite results; and finally that remuneration charged in the 
context of standard setting organizations (SSOs) should be considered as 
comparable, thus indicating that Microsoft charged unreasonable prices. 
The Commission noted that ‘Article 5 of the Decision does not prevent 
Microsoft from submitting its WSPP protocols to an SSO, thereby pos-
sibly reaping alleged ‘non-  royalty benefits’ in the form of cross licenses or 
services provided by the SSOs’.146 This aspect will be examined in the last 
section of this chapter.
In a recent press release, the Commission reaffirmed Microsoft’s ‘ongoing 
142  Decision C(2008)764, para. 107.
143  Decision C(2008)764, paras 130–8. See also, http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/decision2008_annex.pdf.
144  Decision C(2008)764, para. 138.
145  Action brought on 13 May 2008, [2008] OJ C171/42.
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obligation to supply complete and accurate interoperability information’ 
but took notice of the Court’s judgment on article 7 of the 2004 Decision, 
removed the Trustee provision from the 2004 Decision and repealed the 
2005 Trustee Decision, which provided for the modalities of the monitoring 
mechanism and the appointment of a Monitoring Trustee.147 According to 
the Commission, the changes in Microsoft’s behaviour, the possibility for 
third parties to exercise their rights directly before national courts, with 
the  operation  of  private  enforcement  provisions  in  Microsoft’s  licence 
agreements, as well as the experience gained since the process of compli-
ance started in 2004, convinced the Commission that the need for technical 
assistance should now be of an ad hoc character.
Tying
In comparison to the complex and long-  running compliance procedures 
with the interoperability part of the Decision, the conduct remedy imposed 
with regard to the tying of Windows Media Player to Windows was rela-
tively straightforward. The 2004 Commission Decision took the view that 
Microsoft had violated Article 82 EC, in particular because of the possible 
leveraging of its quasi-  monopolistic position in the PC operating systems 
market to the media-  player market. As it is explained in the Commission’s 
Decision, the US judgments did not solve that particular anti-  competitive 
problem. First, the US proceedings focused only on the maintenance of 
monopoly argument and the leveraging argument was abandoned at the 
appeal level. The plaintiffs abandoned the tying claim after the Court of 
Appeal ruled that technological tying should be examined under a rule of 
reason. Secondly, as a consequence of the narrow focus of the US liability 
decision, there was no specific remedy included for tying:148 the US judg-
ment did not provide means enabling OEMs and end-  users to remove 
WMP code from the PC operating system (as it was technically unfeasible 
to remove the WMP code without running the risk that other parts of the 
operating system and third party products relying on WMP would not 
function  properly),149  but  only  requested  Microsoft  to  provide  OEMs 
and end-  users the means to remove access (including icons) to the WMP 
  application or to disable automatic launches.150
The  effectiveness  of  this  remedy  was  limited,  as  only  few  OEMs 
147  IP/09/349.
148  However,  bundling  also  formed  part  of  the  maintenance  of  monopoly 
claim: United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 65.
149  Decision, para. 829.
150  New York v Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp.2d at 153–5.428  Microsoft on trial
took advantage of this possibility.151 The alleged lack of success of the 
remedy152 could be explained by the fact that the final remedial order did 
not require Microsoft to charge a lower licence fee to OEMs that deleted 
access to Microsoft middleware, although this eventuality was included 
in Judge Jackson’s remedial order.153 In addition, the Commission may 
have found this remedy inadequate ‘because it reinforced the applications 
barrier to entry from which Microsoft benefited by encouraging content 
providers to encode their products in Microsoft’s standards’.154
The importance of the leveraging argument and network effects in the 
EC case and the insistence of the Commission on the need to restore the 
freedom  of  choice  of  the  consumers  that  were  coerced  by  Microsoft’s 
conduct to use WMP as a default media-  player led to a more intrusive 
remedy than in the US Microsoft case. The fact that WMP was offered 
for free, that there were other ways to reach consumers for competing 
products, and that the consumers were not forced but simply likely to 
use WMP, did not influence the conclusion of the Commission that there 
was coercion. The extent of the competition problem was of a structural 
nature:  the  ubiquity  of  Windows  undermined  because  of  the  network 
effects competition in media-  players.155 This was thought to deter inno-
vation  and  reduce  consumer  choice  as  competing  media-  players  that 
  consumers preferred were excluded from the market.156
The extent of the competition problem identified, Microsoft’s distribu-
tional advantage, led to a more intrusive competition law remedy than in 
the US case, affecting Microsoft’s freedom to design its products. Article 
6 of the Decision requested Microsoft to offer a version of Windows for 
151  William  H.  Page  and  John  E.  Lopatka,  The  Microsoft  Case  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 215.
152  One  could,  however,  also  argue  that  taking  into  account  the  liability 
claim, which was that OEMs were forced to carry Internet Explorer because they 
could not exclusively promote other browsers, the remedy was fully ‘successful’ 
in providing them with that option. The fact that they may or may not choose to 
take advantage of that right may not necessarily mean the remedy was unsuccess-
ful, unless a ‘successful’ remedy is defined as a socially desirable market outcome, 
which could blur the distinction between competition law intervention and regula-
tory alternatives.
153  Page and Lopatka, n. 151 above, 216.
154  Page and Lopatka, n. 151 above, 218.
155  Decision,  para.  979.  As  the  Commission  put  it,  ‘through  tying  with 
Windows, Microsoft uses Windows as a distribution channel to anti-  competitively 
ensure for itself a significant competition advantage in the media player market. 
Competitors, due to Microsoft’s tying, are a priori at a disadvantage irrespective of 
whether their products are potentially more attractive on the merits’.
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client PCs which does not include WMP media files,157 the new version 
being equally performing. The remedy applied to licences for both end-
  users and OEMs. Microsoft was also asked to refrain from using ‘any tech-
nological, commercial, contractual or any other means which would have 
the equivalent effect of tying WMP to Windows’, for example by selling 
the new version at a higher price than the Windows with WMP version.158 
This  did  not  include  directly  an  obligation  for  Microsoft  to  offer  the 
Windows without WMP version for a lower price than for the Windows 
with WMP version, since most competing media-  players were offered for 
free. In addition, the Decision included an indication of activities having 
an effect equivalent to tying to which Microsoft should not resort, such 
as privileged interoperability between WMP and Windows or any other 
favourable treatment for Windows, conditional discounts, punishing or 
threatening OEMs who obtained Windows without WMP, tying WMP to 
other products that ‘would exhibit a similar ubiquity as Windows’, such 
as Microsoft Office.159 The Commission rejected Microsoft’s arguments 
that removing the WMP would undermine the integrity of the operating 
system, as for the Commission any interdependencies between the two 
products were the result of ‘deliberate choice by Microsoft’ and the inte-
gration of WMP was not a precondition for the multimedia capabilities of 
Windows.160 In other words, the remedy imposed attempted to unravel the 
various links that tied WMP and Windows. Microsoft was given 90 days 
to implement the remedy. The Commission rejected Microsoft’s proposal 
to include other media-  players in Windows (the must carry remedy). This 
aspect will be examined more extensively below.
As was the case for the interoperability remedy, Microsoft invoked its 
right to seek a suspension of the Decision, which was refused by order of 
the President of the CFI. The CFI upheld the liability and the remedial 
part of the decision. The Monitoring Trustee supervised Microsoft’s com-
pliance with the remedy. Microsoft launched Windows XP N (for ‘not 
with media functionality’) to European Union countries in mid-  June 2005. 
157  According to the Commission, ‘these files contain the technologies which 
have been identified as bringing about the foreclosure effect by virtue of WMP 
being tied to Windows, namely the files that support the proprietary Microsoft 
codecs, file formats and DRM formats and the WMP user interface’: Decision, 
para. 1019.
158  Decision, para. 1012.
159  Decision, para. 1013(v).
160  Decision, paras 1027, 1031. The Commission distinguished between two 
sorts  of  dependencies:  ‘technical’  which  would  by  definition  lead  to  the  non-
  functioning of the operating system, and functional dependencies which can be 
dealt with ‘gracefully’: Decision, para. 1033.430  Microsoft on trial
Almost 200 ancillary or support files were removed from XP Home and 
Professional Editions. According to a Microsoft’s press release in April 
2006, there has been virtually no demand from PC manufacturers, retail-
ers and consumers for Windows XP N, and only 1,787 copies of Windows 
XP N have been sold to retailers and distributors in Europe; more impor-
tantly, no OEM was interested in installing and selling computers with a 
less than fully functional version of Windows XP.161
Measured  in  terms  of  the  number  of  sales  for  the  Windows  XP  N 
edition, the effectiveness of the remedy can certainly be questioned.162 
The Commission’s hope of widespread adoption of Windows XP N and 
the emergence of new powerful competitors did not materialize.163 One 
could compare the situation of the media-  player market with that of web-
  browser market, which was the subject of the US Microsoft case. As was 
previously explained, after the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the tying case 
was dropped. By the time of the Court of Appeal’s decision, Microsoft 
commanded an impressive share of the web-  browser market (almost 90 per 
cent). It is only recently that Mozilla Firefox, a competing web-  browser 
developed by Netscape in the form of open source software in 2004, after 
Netscape’s defeat in the ‘first browser war’,164 has been able to challenge 
Internet  Explorer’s  dominant  position,  with  Internet  Explorer’s  usage 
share reducing to 66.1 per cent in the second quarter of 2009.165 The situa-
tion is somewhat different in the media-  player market, where a number of 
competing programs developed during the same period. One could suggest 
that one of the reasons for the faster development of competing products 
in  the  media-  player  market  than  in  the  web-  browser  market  was  the 
relatively important constraint and distraction that litigation in Europe 
161  See www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/european/04-  24-  06windowsxpn 
salesfs.mspx.
162  The alleged ineffectiveness of the remedies may raise questions as to the 
validity of the liability theory of harm in the first place. One could claim that 
Microsoft was essentially found liable for failing to produce a product – Windows 
without media functionality – that no one wanted.
163  There  is  no  doubt  that  powerful  competition  existed  in  media-  players 
before the introduction of Windows XP N, as evidenced by the huge successes of 
the iPod and the associated media format, as well as the Adobe Flash Player.
164  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_wars.
165  See  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usage_share_of_web_browsers.  Mozilla 
Firefox  had  22.47  per  cent  of  usage  share.  According  to  other  reports,  the 
Internet Explorer versions had a total of 54.4 per cent market share in July 2009, 
a  significant  decline  from  65.8  per  cent  in  March  2009.  See  www.techcrunch.
com/2009/07/05/since-  march-  internet-  explorer-  lost-  114-  percent-  share-  to-  firefox-
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caused to Microsoft’s management, and the effect the Decision had on 
Microsoft’s aggressive competitive ethos.166
Substitutionary Remedies
Substitutionary remedies may take different forms, e.g. fines, damages, 
disgorgement of illegally acquired gains. As is the case for remedies in 
kind, the objective of substitutionary remedies is to place the plaintiff or 
the protected category of rightholders in the situation that would have 
existed absent the infringement. This could be achieved through compen-
sation of the rightholders and/or by restoring competition. For example, 
the objective of fines is to raise the costs of the violation of competition 
law and therefore affect the incentive for undertakings to adopt a similar 
conduct in the future. In that sense, pecuniary sanctions such as fines aim 
to restore competition. This deterrence effect will also affect the incentives 
for all other undertakings likely to adopt similar conduct in the future. 
This assumes, as Frederic Jenny observes, ‘that persons engaging in illegal 
practices are rational individuals who (implicitly) consider the expected 
cost and the expected benefit to them of violating a law and will engage in 
such a violation only if it pays (that is, if the expected benefit outweighs 
the expected cost to them) when they are risk neutral or if the expected net 
gain is sufficiently large, if they are risk averse’.167 It follows that ‘(i)n order 
to achieve . . . optimality, the basic framework on penalties should be a 
quantitative one, rather than qualitative. In other words, the quantity of 
the penalty has to be linked to the measure of the effect that the infringe-
ment provoked, rather than on the quality of the action undertaken’.168 
The monetary transfers involved may have different addresses. Indeed, 
substitutionary remedies may consist in fines, which is a monetary transfer 
to the tax-  payer, or damages, which is a monetary transfer to the ‘victims’ 
of the anti-  competitive practice. The choice of one over the other, or of a 
166  Gary L. Reback, Free the Market! (New York: Portfolio, 2009). See also 
the remarks of William E. Kovacic, ‘Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant 
Firm Misconduct’ (1999) 31 Connecticut Law Review 1285, 1288–92, arguing that 
the existence of an antitrust lawsuit may inhibit aggressive commercial behaviour 
by the defendant as well as distract the defendant’s employees from more pro-
ductive functions, thus imposing formidable costs on the company. One could, 
however,  remark  that  Microsoft  continued  to  introduce  new  products  in  the 
market, such as Zune (media-  player hardware) and Silverlight (for Internet media 
playback, like Adobe Flash Player).
167  Jenny, n. 19 above.
168  Enrico Leonardo Camilli, ‘Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases and the Actual 
EU Policy’ (2006) 29(4) World Competition 575.432  Microsoft on trial
combination of both, depends on the emphasis given by each legal system 
to deterrence or compensation. For example, fines serve merely a deter-
rence aim, although it is possible that they could also be conceptualized 
as a compensation mechanism, if one adopts the position that the restor-
ing competition will benefit the ‘public at large’. In any case, setting an 
optimal level for civil sanctions and damages should take into account the 
interaction of these two forms of substitutionary remedies.
Fines
Article  3  of  the  Commission’s  Decision  imposed  on  Microsoft  what 
appeared at the time as a record fine in an abuse of dominance case.169 The 
Commission calculated the amount of the fines according to the method set 
in the Guidelines on Setting Fines of 1998, revised in 2006.170 This includes 
two steps: first, determine the basic amount of the fine, and secondly examine 
the existence of aggravating or attenuating circumstances. The Commission 
took into consideration in order to set the basic amount of the fine the 
gravity of Microsoft’s infringement, a leveraging strategy which comprised 
two separate abuses: a refusal to supply and a tying abuse. The Commission 
found that Microsoft had engaged in a ‘general pattern of conduct’, which 
could produce ‘significant effects on the competition landscape’, in particu-
lar as it would have given Microsoft the ability to erect further barriers to 
entry in the client PC operating systems market and thus ‘to limit the risk of 
a change of paradigm that could strip Microsoft’s overwhelming dominance 
on the client PC operating system market of its competitive importance’.171 
Microsoft would thus be able to extend its quasi-  monopolistic position 
into the server industry or the market for the delivery of content over the 
Internet and on multimedia software. The fact that Microsoft had already 
achieved a dominant or leading position in these industries was found a 
  sufficient indication of the gravity of the infringement.
The initial amount for gravity was set at €162,732,101, without distin-
guishing which amount represented the fine for the refusal to supply inter-
operability infringement and which the one for the tying infringement. This 
starting amount was doubled in order to ensure ‘a sufficient deterrent effect 
on Microsoft’, in light of the undertaking’s significant economic capaci-
ty.172 The duration of the infringement was also particularly long: the 
refusal to supply abuse lasted six years and it was still ongoing at the time of 
169  The latest record is held by the fine imposed on Intel. See IP/09/745.
170  Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines [1998] OJ C9/3; Guidelines on 
the Method of Setting Fines [2006] OJ C210/2.
171  Decision, paras 1061–8.
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the decision; the tying abuse lasted more than five years. The Commission 
set the overall duration of the infringement at five years and five months, 
thus increasing the basic amount of the fine by 50 per cent to €497,196,204, 
taking into account an increase of 10 per cent for each year of participation 
in the infringement. The fine represented 7.5 per cent of Microsoft’s turno-
ver on the market for client PC and work group server operating systems 
in Europe,173 thus below the threshold of 10 per cent set by the Guidelines. 
No aggravating or attenuating circumstances were found.
The CFI affirmed the fine imposed by the Commission and rejected 
Microsoft’s arguments that no fine should be imposed, as the infringements 
resulted from ‘novel theories of law’ or that Microsoft had already taken 
measures, following the US settlement, to provide the necessary degree of 
interoperability.174 The Court also acknowledged that ‘the obligation to 
state reasons does not require the Commission to indicate in its decision the 
figures relating to the method of calculating the fines’.175 Finally, the CFI 
found that the doubling of the basic amount of the fine by the Commission 
was justified for deterrence reasons: in a prescient (given recent develop-
ments) paragraph, the Court noted that ‘since Microsoft is very likely to 
maintain its dominant position on the client PC operating systems market, 
at least over the coming years, it cannot be precluded that it will have other 
opportunities to use leveraging vis-  á-  vis other adjacent markets’.176
Although the fine imposed on Microsoft seems particularly important, 
its deterrent effect may be questioned. In the high technology sector, where 
network effects may tip the market for some time towards a particular 
technological standard, incurring the costs of civil penalties may still be a 
profitable strategy for monopolists. The effectiveness of this part of the EC 
remedy should be examined in comparison with the pecuniary sanctions 
imposed in the US Microsoft case. There is no provision for civil penal-
ties, such as fines, under the Sherman Act and their adoption may not 
be possible, at least in the near future.177 In US antitrust law, pecuniary 
173  CFI judgment, para. 1319.
174  CFI judgment, para. 1324.
175  CFI judgment, para. 1361.
176  CFI judgment, para. 1363.
177  The proposal to make the necessary amendments to permit the imposition 
of civil fines has been rejected by the recent Antitrust Modernization Commission, 
Report and Recommendations (April 2007), pp. 285–91. For a critical analysis, see 
Stephen  Calkins,  ‘Civil  Monetary  Remedies  Available  to  Antitrust  Enforcers’ 
(2006) 40 University of San Francisco Law Review 567; Harry First, ‘The Case for 
Antitrust Civil Penalties’ Antitrust Law Journal (forthcoming); New York Law 
and Economics Research Paper No. 08-  38, available at SSRN at http://ssrn.com/
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sanctions take the form of wealth transfers to the victims of the exclusion-
ary practice, which may engage a private action to collect damages. Most 
often, this leads to settlements entered between the monopolist and the 
claimants. The next section will discuss the availability of damages and 
settlements as an effective ‘pecuniary’ remedy. These remedies, to which 
one  could  add  restitution/disgorgement,  rarely  ordered  in  the  United 
States and unavailable in Europe, provide compensation/restitution to the 
victims of the competition law infringement, as well as deter the monopo-
list or dominant firm from adopting similar practices in the future by 
acting indirectly on their incentives.
Damages
In  comparison  to  the  amount  of  the  fines  imposed  by  the  European 
Commission, the monetary transfers to consumers and competitors affected 
by Microsoft’s antitrust law infringement in the US case seem particularly 
important. According to Harry First, more than 220 private cases have 
been  filed  against  Microsoft,  from  consumers  and  rivals.178  Consumer 
class actions represent the largest group of claims (more than 80 per cent), 
with individuals having filed 30 cases and state Attorneys General having 
filed two cases on behalf of their non-  business citizens.179 This category 
of private plaintiffs had an important hurdle to overcome, as they had to 
prove that they were overcharged, following Microsoft’s maintenance of 
monopoly in the operating systems market. As indirect purchasers, they 
were barred from bringing a federal antitrust private damages claim,180 
with the exception of some states that provide the possibility for state 
antitrust actions filed in state courts. All class actions had also to pass the 
procedure of class certification, which was in this case overly complicated 
by the fact that it was not clear how much of the alleged overcharge the 
direct  purchasers  had  passed  on  to  indirect  purchasers.  This  required 
individualized determinations which made class certification particularly 
difficult.181
Important  difficulties  also  arose  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  an 
overcharge for Windows, as Microsoft was allegedly able to maintain 
its monopoly power by excluding potential competing platforms in the 
178  Harry  First,  Netscape  is  Dead:  Remedy  Lessons  from  the  Microsoft 
Litigation, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-  49 (29 August 2008), 
available at SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260803.
179  First, n. 178 above, 6. 
180  Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
181  The majority of the courts adopted, however, a liberal standard for class 
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operating systems market.182 The issue revolved on the question of what 
would  have  been  the  price  of  Windows,  had  Netscape  and  Java  been 
able to challenge Microsoft’s dominant position and develop a compet-
ing platform. Judge Jackson’s judgment contained some indications that 
Microsoft was able to charge higher prices for Windows 98 upgrades, 
while  lower  prices  would  have  also  been  profitable.  However,  Judge 
Jackson also recognized that it might be in Microsoft’s interest to ‘keep 
the price of Windows low today’ in order to support the growth of the 
operating  systems  market.183  These  elements  offered  the  possibility  to 
OEMs, such as IBM and Gateway, which did not accept Microsoft’s offer 
to distribute and promote Internet Explorer and therefore did not receive 
any compensation in the form of rebates, to enter significant settlements 
with Microsoft.
Additional private damages suits in the US Microsoft case included the 
two competitors that brought the case against Microsoft in the European 
Union,  Netscape/AOL  and  Sun.  Netscape  settled  in  2003,  while  Sun 
settled a few days after the publication of the Decision of the European 
Commission in 2004 and consequently retreated as a third party intervener 
in the EC litigation. This had the effect of pushing SAMBA and the open 
source community to step in as the main opponent of Microsoft in the 
post-  decision 2004 period, until they settled in the aftermath of the CFI’s 
judgment. As for Microsoft’s other opponents in the EC antitrust case, 
both RealNetworks and Novell settled, with the exception of Novell’s 
pending  lawsuit  against  Microsoft  relating  to  the  damage  suffered  by 
WordPerfect  (for  lack  of  interoperability  information),  which  because 
of  its  cross-  platform  capacity  posed  a  potential  threat  to  Microsoft’s 
182  Whether Netscape together with Java could have been a real threat to 
Windows was not clear and definitely not proved. Netscape’s CEO Jim Barksdale 
completely dismissed that likelihood at trial, stating that Netscape never planned 
such entry into operating systems. However, Microsoft had taken this potential 
threat, expounded by Netscape’s CTO Mark Andreesen, very seriously as internal 
Microsoft emails presented at trial revealed. But if Netscape’s success was very 
unlikely in the absence of anti-  competitive actions, the remedy should be limited 
to erasing the anti-  competitive hurdle and should not involve a restructuring of 
the market.
183  United  States  v  Microsoft,  84  F.Supp.2d  9,  27  (D.D.C.  1999),  Finding 
of Fact, para. 66). However, this argument is not credible given that Microsoft 
already had over 90 per cent market share in the OS market. In fact, it is likely that 
potential competition in the OS market drove Microsoft to charge a significantly 
lower price than the unconstrained monopoly price. For a detailed analysis of 
pricing of Windows, see Nicholas Economides, ‘The Microsoft Antitrust Case’ 
(2001) 1 Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy 7, 
16–19, available at www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Microsoft_Antitrust.final.pdf.436  Microsoft on trial
monopoly in the operating systems market.184 In total, the settlements in 
the United States appear to have exceeded US$3.5 billion.185
In comparison, the fine imposed by the European Commission, which 
represents  only  a  fraction  of  the  total  amount  of  settlements,  seems 
to  lead  to  underdeterrence,  absent  private  enforcement.  This  conclu-
sion is reinforced by the absence of any private action brought against 
Microsoft for damages in the European Union. There are two cumula-
tive explanations for this: first, private enforcement of EC competition 
law is only nascent and does not include a system of treble damages or 
other incentives for private actions.186 Secondly, the heart of the EC case 
was not maintenance of monopoly, and therefore a possible overcharge 
for Windows, but the extension of the monopoly power of Microsoft to 
the work group server and media-  player markets. Concerning the work 
group server market, it is not clear if consumer harm took a different 
form than just a slower pace of innovation because of the exclusion of 
competitors, or whether it led also to an increase in the prices charged 
by Microsoft. In the media-  player market, the product was given away 
for  free,  so  the  harm  to  consumers  was  not  relating  to  higher  prices 
but to possibly lower quality, as allegedly better quality media-  players 
were excluded from the market. It would, however, be extremely dif-
ficult and costly to quantify this reduction in quality.187 Because of the 
limited access of European consumers to damages and the difficulties in 
obtaining damages in the United States as a result of comity concerns, in 
particular after Empagran,188 European consumers will remain without 
compensation and, consequently, there will be less deterrence. The weak-
ness of private enforcement of competition law in Europe indicates that 
fines should be set at a higher level in order to ensure more effective 
deterrence.189
184  First, n. 178 above, 9.
185  First, n. 178 above, 27.
186  See the recent discussion of possible options in European Commission, 
White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM 
(2008)165.
187  However, during the infringement period there was significant innovation 
and entry of new products, such as the iPod and the Adobe Flash Player.
188  F. Hoffmann-  La Roche Lt. v Empagran SA, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
189  This  supposes,  however,  a  clarification  of  the  liability  standard  under 
Article  82  EC.  The  European  Commission  has  recently  adopted  guidance  on 
Article 82 EC: DG Competition, Communication from the Commission, Guidance 
on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 864(2009)final. Note 
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3.  CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE REMEDIES
The success of the interoperability remedy required a sustained and con-
tinuing  effort  of  setting  and  monitoring  compliance  standards,  which 
was particularly difficult in the absence of a regulatory authority that 
could  supervise  its  enforcement.  The  European  Commission  initiated 
the  mechanism  of  the  Monitoring  Trustee,  which  proved  particularly 
useful in the promotion of the SAMBA-  Microsoft settlement, the only 
positive outcome so far of the Commission’s Decision. However, the CFI 
annulled this part of the Decision. The crafting of remedies involves the 
consideration of an adequate institutional mechanism for their enforce-
ment. The design of the remedy for the tying part of the Decision was also 
particularly problematic, as the Commission took a quasi-  regulatory role 
by imposing on Microsoft a particular product design which, however, 
produced very poor results in the marketplace.
Enforcement Difficulties of the Interoperability Remedy: Institutional 
Aspects
The appointment of a Monitoring Trustee was the primary mechanism of 
enforcement of the remedy imposed by the Commission for both the inter-
operability and tying parts. The Monitoring Trustee was required to assess 
whether the information made available by Microsoft was complete and 
accurate, and to ensure that Windows XP N was of no less performance 
than any bundled version of Windows which Microsoft would continue 
to provide on the market. The Monitoring Trustee was independent from 
Microsoft, although on its payroll. Article 4 of the Decision imposed on 
Microsoft an obligation to refrain from repeating any act or practice which 
would have the same or equivalent object or effect as the anti-  competitive 
conduct.  This  exemplified  the  forward-  looking  role  of  the  Monitoring 
Trustee, as it was clear that ‘the obligation to disclose interoperability 
information must apply ‘in a prospective manner’ to future generations 
is complementary to the Commission’s specific enforcement Decisions. The choice 
of the instrument of guidance on enforcement priorities offers to the Commission 
more leeway in presenting its approach on Article 82 EC. The Commission could 
not have adopted guidelines contrary to the rulings of the EU courts (see the 
most  recent  reminder  by  Advocate  General  Kokott  in  Case  C-  8/08  T-  Mobile 
Netherlands BV and others, para. 29). The Commission maintains the ability to 
reject a complaint when it considers that a case lacks priority for other reasons (e.g. 
lack of Community interest).438  Microsoft on trial
of Microsoft’s products’.190 Microsoft successfully challenged this part of 
the Decision at the CFI for lack of legal basis.
The  CFI  found  that  Regulation  17/62,  in  force  at  the  time  of  the 
Decision, did not provide the Commission with the authority to compel 
Microsoft to grant to an independent monitoring trustee powers which 
the Commission itself was not authorized to confer to a third party.191 The 
Court questioned the independence that the Monitoring Trustee would 
have had from both the Commission and Microsoft and the broad scope 
of his powers and mission. It also noted that no limit in time was envis-
aged for his continuing intervention in monitoring Microsoft’s compli-
ance. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality required that the costs 
associated with the enforcement of the remedy and compliance should not 
be borne by the undertaking but by the Commission, in fulfilling its own 
investigation and enforcement responsibilities.192
The  conservatism  showed  by  the  CFI  in  envisioning  an  effective 
compliance mechanism seems misplaced. First, the independence of the 
Monitoring  Trustee  from  Microsoft,  but  also  from  the  Commission, 
ensured his impartiality, which was an essential characteristic in order to 
enhance compliance and cooperation from Microsoft. This was crucial for 
the success of the remedy (providing adequate information on specifica-
tions). After all, it was because the Monitoring Trustee had developed a 
relation of confidence with Microsoft’s technical staff that he had been able 
to mediate successfully between Microsoft and SAMBA, ironically during 
the period following the Court’s judgment and before the Commission 
formally replaced him with a system of ad hoc external experts.193 It may 
have not been possible to achieve the same degree of cooperation from 
Microsoft had the Commission employed internal or external experts for 
the enforcement of the Decision, as in this case no direct relation (without 
the intermediation of lawyers) would have existed between Microsoft’s 
technical staff and the technical staff of the parties requiring interoper-
ability. It is true that the Commission’s Decision should have included 
a realistic time horizon for the monitoring of the Decision and should 
have quantified the costs. However, as became clear in the compliance 
procedure under the US antitrust decision, the extent and time scale of 
monitoring was an unknown factor depending on the clear articulation 
of what the government wanted Microsoft to produce and on the will-
190  CFI judgment, para. 1270.
191  CFI judgment, para. 1271.
192  CFI judgment, para. 1277.
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ingness and ability of Microsoft to provide detailed specifications for its 
interoperability information. Sharing the costs of the enforcement mecha-
nism would have limited the exorbitant costs for Microsoft, which may 
seem out of proportion, but at the same time it would have reduced to 
a minor extent Microsoft’s incentives to comply with the Decision. The 
Commission could nevertheless have taken in charge a larger proportion 
of the expenses during the first period of the operation of the enforcement 
mechanism, Microsoft’s share progressively increasing in order to incur 
the costs of delayed compliance.
The appointment of the Monitoring Trustee illustrates the blurring of 
the distinction between competition law and regulation, when it comes 
to the enforcement of far-  reaching and forward looking remedies, with 
regard to the scope of the obligations imposed and the time-  horizon of 
the  remedy.  The  European  Monitoring  Trustee  intervened  three  years 
after the Technical Committee in the US antitrust case began to monitor 
Microsoft’s compliance. The US Technical Committee had become at that 
time a quasi-  regulatory entity with 40 experts employed and the ability 
to persuade the US Department of Justice and the states that additional 
obligations and burdens should be imposed in order to ensure effective 
interoperability.  The  Technical  Committee  had  the  ability  to  receive 
complaints, interview Microsoft’s staff and examine the Windows’ source 
code, subject to confidentiality; the expenses of the Committee, includ-
ing the salaries, being covered by Microsoft.194 The Monitoring Trustee 
was able to build on these efforts to ensure interoperability and to benefit 
from the US experience but he also contributed to the compliance effort 
in the United States. Indeed, in 2006 the US Technical Committee started 
working closely with Microsoft’s experts in order to improve the technical 
documentation provided to licensees, using ‘as a starting point the speci-
fication agreed upon between Microsoft and the Monitoring Trustee’ in 
the EC case.195
One could envision a higher degree of cooperation at the remedial stage 
of multi-  jurisdictional cases, such as Microsoft, if compliance is ensured 
by  an  independent  entity,  like  a  Monitoring  Trustee  or  a  Technical 
Committee, including the sharing of the costs of the compliance mecha-
nism between jurisdictions. It is clear that despite the different theories 
of antitrust liability in Europe and in the United States, the remedies 
imposed with regard to the interoperability part of the Decision it the end 
194  224 F.Supp.2d, final judgment, Part IV.B.
195  Joint Status Report on Microsoft’s Compliance with the Final Judgments, 
7 September 2006, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218000/218096.htm.440  Microsoft on trial
converged. This type of international cooperation at the remedial stage 
of antitrust cases could be enhanced if the Commission had the ability 
to appoint independent compliance officers/experts. The procedure has 
been used in the context of commitment Decisions under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003, such as the Deutsche Bundesliga196 and FA Premier 
League197 cases concerning the collective selling of media rights to foot-
ball matches, where the Commission appointed a monitoring trustee to 
monitor the auctions of the Premier League rights, and in Repsol,198 where 
the monitoring trustee had the task of monitoring the opening up of the 
fuel distribution system in Spain. Monitoring trustees have also been used 
in  merger  cases  cleared  with  obligations  and  commitments,  where  the 
trustees enjoy important powers, such as the supervision and management 
of the divested business, the exercise of shareholder rights or the appoint-
ment of board members.199 The CFI’s decision in the Microsoft case raises 
questions as to the legality of this practice, in particular as the company 
giving the commitment is usually required to incur the trustee’s costs. 
Regulation 1/2003 does not grant the Commission any power to establish 
such monitoring mechanisms and this is certainly an issue that has to be 
tackled in the recent review process of Regulation 1/2003.200
‘Failure’ of the Windows N Remedy and the ‘Must Carry’ Proposal
As discussed above, the Commission Decision, upheld by the CFI, found 
Microsoft liable for tying WMP with Windows. WMP participates in a 
market where it and its substitute media-  players are distributed without 
charge. Since there are always costs of developing such software, both 
Microsoft and its competitors sell below the production and distribution 
cost of media-  players. Of course, as part of Windows, WMP forms part of 
the Windows revenue.
Companies  such  as  Microsoft  and  its  competitors  (for  example, 
196  Commission Decision 2005/396/EC, Bundesliga [2005] OJ L134/46.
197  Commission  Notice  published  pursuant  to  Article  19(3)  of  Council 
Regulation No 17 concerning case COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453, FA Premier 
League [2004] OJ C115/3.
198  Commission Decision 2006/446/EC, Repsol [2006] OJ L176/104.
199  See  e.g.  Commission  Decisions  COMP/M.5406  IPIC/MAN  Ferrostaal 
AG [2009] OJ C114/8; COMP/M.5253 Sanofi-  Aventis/Zentiva, 4 February 2009; 
COMP/M.5224 EDF/British Energy, 22 December 2008. Commission Notice on 
remedies acceptable under Council Regulation 139/2004 and under Commission 
Regulation 802/2004 [2008] OJ C267/1.
200  Although  nothing  is  included  on  this  topic  in  European  Commission, 
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RealAudio) distribute their media-  players for free with the hope that their 
software development costs will be recouped if (i) in the future the product 
is sold at a positive price, or (ii) the firm will be able to sell upgraded ver-
sions of the software (with more features) at a positive price, or (iii) the 
firm will be able to sell products or services complementary to the free 
product (for example, music or video downloads at a positive price or 
software that produces audio or video in a compatible format). Although 
media-  players have been distributed for free for almost a decade and have 
experienced significant technological advances, there is no evidence that 
their basic versions will ever be sold at a positive price. Additionally, with 
the exception of Apple’s iTunes, there is no evidence of substantial rev-
enues from sales of complementary products,201 and iTunes profits come 
almost  exclusively  from  sales  of  the  complementary  hardware  (iTunes 
players). Thus, there are no damages arising from higher prices because 
of restriction of competition, since no company charges a positive price. 
The only possible damages could arise from a restriction of the full extent 
of varieties and qualities of media-  players that might be available in the 
absence of the tying behaviour of Microsoft.
The variety issue is further complicated by the fact that a number of 
companies distribute media-  players that each have a ‘favoured’ format 
but can also play content in a number of other formats, to the extent that 
the other format owners allow it. So, for example, WMP plays WMA (the 
Microsoft-  favoured format) as well as MP3 (based on a public standard) 
but does not play the RealAudio format because its specifications have 
not been made public. Similarly, RealAudio plays its proprietary format, 
as well as WMA, MP3, and others. Thus, wide distribution of WMP 
does not necessarily imply dominance of the WMA format since WMP 
can play many formats. It is possible, however, to argue that even dual 
encoding (i.e. encoding in a number of different formats) may confer a 
distributional  advantage  to  Microsoft.  Ian  Ayres  and  Barry  Nalebuff 
noted that ‘Microsoft would still have the unique ability to ensure that 
its media player would be on all new machines—and thus eventually on 
all machines’ and that ‘in turn, would mean that a content provider that 
encoded its content in the WMP format would be ensured nearly 100% 
reach in the market’ and would have therefore little incentive to engage 
201  Of course there are attempts to get revenue from complementary goods. 
For example, RealNetworks offers an upgraded version at a positive price as well 
as subscription services for content. However, these revenues are not substantial 
and have led to the decline of companies that are essentially only in the software 
media-  player business, such as RealNetworks.442  Microsoft on trial
in dual encoding.202 The conclusion that WMP will eventually be on all 
PCs is true only under restrictive modelling assumptions, and empirical 
evidence attests that it is certainly not true today. Additionally, the fact 
that WMP plays a number of other formats, including some based on 
open standards, makes the exclusivity argument of including WMP with 
Windows weak. In the aftermath of the US case settlement, any consumer 
as well as any computer manufacturer can set up any media-  player as 
the default one, thereby severely limiting any distributional advantage 
of the joint distribution of WMP with Windows. However, they do not 
benefit  from  the  same  distributional  opportunities  as  WMP,  precisely 
because dual encoding may not be materially equivalent to ubiquitous 
encoding. Finally, one could argue that the distribution advantage that 
any player enjoys is also limited because any rival media-  player can be 
downloaded and installed in a few minutes. If consumers do not think 
it is worth spending a couple of minutes to download and install rival 
players, clearly consumers do not see significant value in the variety and 
quality that rival players may add. Thus, the damages that can be ascer-
tained from Microsoft’s distributional advantage cannot be substantial. 
The Commission and the CFI may have overestimated the distributional 
advantage conferred on WMP by its joint distribution with Windows.
The  Commission  imposed  as  a  remedy  on  Microsoft  the  require-
ment  to  produce  and  distribute  in  the  European  Union  a  version  of 
Windows without WMP, which became known as Windows XP N. The 
Commission’s  remedy  allowed  Microsoft  to  continue  producing  and 
distributing in the EU the US version of Windows that included WMP 
but was subject to the requirements of the consent decree that resolved 
the US case The CFI did not mandate a specific price difference between 
Windows and Windows XP N.203 The two versions of Windows were sold 
202  See Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, ‘Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU’s 
Antitrust Case and Remedy’ (2005) 2 The Economist’s Voice 1, 5.
203  The lack of a price difference requirement is in sharp contrast to the pro-
posal to the district court by the nine states (‘litigating states’) which did not agree 
with the US Department of Justice Microsoft settlement that was also signed by 
nine other states. The litigating states proposed to ‘freeze Windows’ in its pre-
  1998 condition and impose on Microsoft the requirement to sell any additional 
functionality at an additional price. It is interesting, however, that the CFI noted 
in its judgment that ‘[s]hould Microsoft now decide to sell the unbundled version 
of Windows at the same price as the bundled version, the Commission would 
examine that price by reference to the present market situation and in the light of 
Microsoft’s obligations to refrain from any measure having an equivalent effect to 
tying and, if necessary, adopt a new decision pursuant to Art. 82 EC’. CFI judg-
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in the EU at the same price, and practically no OEM bought and adopted 
Windows XP N.204 Thus, the remedy imposed by the Commission had no 
noticeable effect in the marketplace. At the same time, the dire predictions 
of expanded dominance of WMP never materialized in the long period 
between the beginning of the EC case and the Commission’s Decision, 
or even later. In contrast, a new, until recently proprietary, format pro-
moted by Apple (tied to hardware also produced by Apple!) has become 
the dominant format in the market for song downloads, a key market 
for goods that are complementary to media-  players. Additionally, Flash 
Player, a new player from Adobe, has become the standard video-  player 
in web-  browsers.
We are at a loss to understand why the European Commission thought 
that  requiring  Microsoft  to  produce  and  distribute  Windows  without 
WMP was going to change significantly competition in media-  players. It 
was almost mathematically certain that Windows XP N (without WMP), 
sold at the same price as Windows (with WMP), would not sell well, and 
therefore would have little impact on the market share of WMP. It is also 
hard to imagine how depriving consumers of WMP in Windows XP N in 
the post-  US settlement environment, where both the OEM and the final 
consumer can designate any media-  player as the default one, would have 
enhanced consumers’ choice. The Commission rather considered that con-
sumers expected a media-  player but argued that the OEMs should be free 
to build PCs that feature a non-  Microsoft media-  player.
In negotiations before the Commission’s Decision was announced, the 
Commission rejected a reported Microsoft proposed remedy to include in 
the distribution of Windows three rival media-  players besides WMP and 
let the consumer designate the default player.205 This proposal, which 
would have guaranteed as wide a distribution of RealAudio and other 
players  as  WMP,  would  have  erased  any  distributional  advantage  of 
WMP, would have dispelled any tying concerns, and would have given full 
decision power to consumers. Such a remedy would have addressed the 
competition law concerns raised by Microsoft’s abuse much more effec-
tively than the proposed remedy.206 At the same time, its adoption would 
204  Windows XP N sold less than 2,000 copies.
205  See Byron Acohido and Noelle Knox, ‘Regulators Want Microsoft to Pull 
Media Player Out’, USA Today, 25 March 2004, available at www.usatoday.com/
money/industries/technology/2004-  03-  25-  msoft-  cover_x.htm.
206  Indeed, the issue in this case was ‘not that Microsoft integrates [WMP] in 
Windows, but that it offers on the market only a version of Windows in which 
[WMP] is integrated, that is to say, that it does not allow OEMs or consumers to 
obtain Windows without [WMP] or, at least, to remove [WMP] from the system 444  Microsoft on trial
have at least guaranteed the ability of even a dominant firm (Microsoft) in 
the complementary good (Windows) to innovate and distribute in the way 
it finds most appropriate. The benefits of this proposal both for consumers 
and innovation are obvious and substantial in comparison to the imposed 
remedy.207 It provides consumers with the best of both worlds: the benefits 
of stand-  alone media-  players and the benefits of an integrated solution.
We argue that the requirement that a dominant firm ‘must carry’ the 
competitors products should, however, only be imposed when (i) there 
are substantial distributional advantages for the dominant firm, and (ii) 
there are substantial consumer losses arising from the lack of distribution 
through the dominant firm. Because of the US case settlement, computer 
manufacturers  can  install  any  media-  player  they  want  without  facing 
any penalties or retaliation from Microsoft. To the extent that computer 
manufacturers install what consumers desire, the present extent of dis-
tribution of WMP with Windows seems more a reflection of consumers’ 
choice than a decision by Microsoft. Of course, consumers are likely to 
be better off if they receive more free software delivered with their new 
computer. This, however, does not mean that the dominant firm should 
have the obligation to distribute this software, and additionally to do so 
without collecting practically any revenue from competitors whose soft-
ware it is forced to distribute, unless the operating system is considered as 
an essential facility. But in this case the standards of liability are different 
(allegedly stricter) than those required for tying.208 It seems to us that, if a 
Footnote 206 (cont.)
consisting of Windows and [WMP]’. CFI judgment, para. 1149. The remedy could 
have identified a number of media-  players from those existing at the time of the 
commitment of the abuse that could have been integrated into Windows. It is in 
this respect different from a common carrier obligation, as it would not necessar-
ily have extended to media-  players that would have been commercialized after 
the termination of the abuse.
207  This  is  particularly  surprising  since  Prof.  Mario  Monti,  head  of  the 
Commission at the time, was quoted as saying as regards the objectives of the 
Commission in the Decision: ‘In the end, we decided to do what’s best for innova-
tion and European consumers’. Acohido and Knox, n. 205 above.
208  The Court of Justice took a restrictive view of the obligation of a dominant 
undertaking to grant access to its facilities by imposing a number of conditions 
in Case C-  7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-  7791, 
paras 41, 45–6. The refusal ‘must be likely to eliminate all competition’ on the 
part of the competitor requesting access, such access should be indispensable and 
not only make it harder for the requesting undertaking to compete, and it should 
not be capable of being objectively justified. With regard to the indispensability 
condition, the Court held that access would have been indispensable only if it 
was not economically viable to create a home-  delivery system for a newspaper   Quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases    445
  competition authority decides to impose a ‘must carry’ remedy, it should 
bring a proper essential facilities case, rather than rely on the more favour-
able liability standards of tying (as regards standard of proof) and then 
ask for a ‘must carry’ remedy.
The ‘must carry’ obligation is of special interest because it has been 
considered by the European Commission as a remedy in its current inves-
tigation of Microsoft for bundling Internet Explorer with Windows, as 
discussed in detail below.209 Clearly, the Commission could not require 
that Windows be distributed without a web-  browser and the ability to 
download a browser because that would severely cripple the ability of the 
typical user to reach the Internet. But does it make sense for Microsoft to 
be required to distribute rival browsers?
It could be argued that requiring Microsoft to distribute rival browsers 
may not provide an appropriate remedy, in the presence of weak antici-
pative  effects.  As  with  media-  players,  competing  web-  browsers  can  be 
downloaded and installed in a few minutes, so the reluctance of consum-
ers to do so might show that they do not find it sufficiently desirable. To 
this claim it is possible to respond that consumers may have a status quo 
bias favouring Internet Explorer, particularly because, having used only 
Internet Explorer, the user has no real way of knowing what it might mean 
for a web-  browser to be superior.210 One could also advance a natural 
reluctance to take on additional learning costs associated with using a dif-
ferent browser. OEMs may also refrain from the additional support costs 
that are associated with offering another browser. It could be argued, nev-
ertheless, that the damage that consumers may incur from the joint distri-
bution of Internet Explorer with Windows is very limited. In the particular 
with a comparable circulation to the dominant firm’s. One could argue that the 
conditions in Bronner set the outer boundaries of the special responsibility of a 
dominant firm and consequently of the corresponding duty, under Article 82 EC, 
to abstain from any action that would be likely to exclude rivals from the market. 
The excluded rival would be granted access only if it is impossible for an undertak-
ing with a comparable output to the dominant firm to develop such facility, which 
indicates that the Court applies a ‘not yet as efficient’ as test.
209  MEMO/08/19,  available  at  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/08/19 (awaiting the publication of the final decision of the 
Commission).
210  Behavioural  law  and  economics  have  emphasized  the  consideration  of 
status quo bias in envisioning consumer behaviour. See William Samuelson and 
Richard Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’ (1988) 1(1) Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty 7. On the importance of heuristics and biases in analysing 
behaviour, see Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds), Judgment 
under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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case of the browser, as contrasted with the media-  player, there is almost 
full  compatibility  between  the  various  browsers.  Additionally,  Firefox 
provides a plug-  in that emulates Internet Explorer and can even be used 
for live updates from Microsoft that require Internet Explorer. As with the 
media-  player analysis, there are no damages because of price competition, 
since all the browsers are distributed for free. Additionally, the almost full 
compatibility of browsers implies that the benefits of variety and quality 
will be smaller than in the media-  player market. Thus, it seems likely that 
imposition of the ‘must carry’ remedy might be out of proportion in this 
case.
If  the  effects  on  consumers  are  considered  to  be  more  substantial, 
the  ‘must  carry’  remedy  might  be  an  appropriate  remedy,  although  it 
could face some practical difficulties. The issue of the mandatory Java 
distribution  was  raised  in  the  US  Microsoft  case.211  The  court  found 
that a ‘must carry’ requirement would have not provided a substantial 
benefit  to  competition,  once  Microsoft’s  anti-  competitive  restraints  on 
other channels of Java distribution were lifted by the other parts of the 
court’s remedy (exclusivity arrangements).212 The reason for the court’s 
reluctance was, however, its uneasiness in granting a specific competitor, 
Sun Microsystems, an advantage in its efforts to compete with Microsoft, 
not accorded to other competitors in the industry. The court noted that 
‘favoritism of one market participant over another in a remedy provision 
places the Court in the improper position of exerting too much control 
over the market’.213 An adequate remedy would provide equal treatment 
to third parties, in order to restore competition. For example, complain-
ants should not be the only ones receiving the benefits of a ‘must carry’ 
obligation:  any  firm  that  is  capable  of  challenging  the  dominant  firm 
should be included in the design of this obligation. It follows that for the 
must carry obligation to function equitably, new products should also 
be periodically included. This could raise some practical difficulties, such 
as which browsers (from the five main ones and/or browsers from niche 
players) to include, and on what licence terms, as well as how to align the 
release schedule of these browsers with the release schedule of Windows, 
to be solved by further negotiation between the parties.
Negotiations between the Commission and Microsoft on whether to 
implement a version of a must carry rule gave rise to important recent 
developments. As previously explained, the Commission opened formal 
211  New York v Microsoft, 224 F.Supp.2d at 188–90.
212  224 F.Supp.2d at 189.
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proceedings  on  Opera’s  complaint  in  December  2007  and  issued  a 
Statement  of  Objections  to  Microsoft  in  January  2009.  To  terminate 
the  Commission’s  current  investigation  in  the  Internet  Explorer  case, 
Microsoft initially announced214 that it would not distribute the standard 
Windows 7 in Europe. Instead, it intended to produce and distribute in 
Europe a special edition of Windows 7 called Windows 7 E which would 
not have Internet Explorer or any other browser pre-  installed, adopting 
the removal approach of the Windows XP N remedy imposed by the 
Commission in the WMP case, as the sole version of Windows in Europe. 
OEMs would have the option to install a web-  browser of their choice as 
the default as well as include other browsers before the PC reached the 
final consumers.
As part of the initial proposal of Microsoft, European consumers who 
would buy an upgrade to Windows 7 for Windows Vista or XP, as well 
as those consumers who would buy Windows 7 and install it themselves 
from scratch on a ‘naked’ computer (which comes from the manufac-
turer without an operating system) would be given a version of Windows 
7 E that would include a file transfer protocol (FTP) link to a website 
from which they could download and install Internet Explorer 8. The 
Commission applauded Microsoft’s steps to provide OEMs more flexibil-
ity, but was critical of Microsoft’s decision on the distribution of the retail 
upgrade or retail clean install.215
Based  on  that  public  feedback,  as  well  as  on  private  discussions, 
Microsoft withdrew its unilateral plan of distributing Windows 7 E216 and 
proposed a final resolution that would commit217 it to (i) distribute a ‘ballot 
screen’ through software update218 to European users of Windows XP, 
214  See  www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=abzAzMCoi
3Rw.
215  See Memo/09/272, 12 June 2009, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
ReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/272&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
216  See  http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/07/31/
windows-  7-  and-  browser-  choice-  in-  europe.aspx.
217  Microsoft’s  Commitment  to  address  the  competition  concerns  identi-
fied by the European Commission in Case No. COMP/C-  3/39.530, available at 
www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-  msft/docs/07-  24-  09Commitment.doc 
(‘Commitment’).
218  The  words  ‘ballot  screen’  were  used  inappropriately  in  the  preliminary 
design of the remedy; the appropriate words are ‘choice screen’. There is no ballot 
here and there is no decision by majority or any other rule that will be imposed on 
all participants. The screen will allow each consumer to set the default browser for 
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Windows Vista, Windows 7, and Windows client PC operating systems, 
by means of Windows update; and (ii) allow both OEMs and users to turn 
on or off Internet Explorer.219 Thus, the remedy does not only concern 
Windows 7. The European Commission received comments from third 
parties  and  finally  accepted  Microsoft’s  commitments  by  adopting  an 
Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 decision on 16 December 2009220.
This remedy may have far-  reaching consequences on the structure of 
the web-  browser industry and the distributional advantage of Internet 
Explorer. The choice screen will give those users who have set Internet 
Explorer as their default web-  browser an opportunity to choose whether 
to install (and which) competing web-  browser(s) in addition to the one(s) 
they already have.221 Users will be able to select one or more of the web-
  browsers offered through the choice screen. Microsoft commits to dis-
tribute and install the choice screen software update ‘in a manner that is 
designed to bring about installation of this update at a rate that is as least 
as high as that for the most recent version of Internet Explorer offered 
via Windows Update’.222 It is also emphasized that ‘nothing in the design 
and implementation of the Choice Screen and the presentation of compet-
ing web browsers will express a bias for a Microsoft web browser or any 
other web browser or discourage the user from downloading and installing 
additional web browsers via the Choice Screen and making a web browser 
competing with a Microsoft web browser the default’.223
The design of the choice screen attempts to represent as best as pos-
sible actual consumer preferences. At the same time, it avoids providing 
an excessively large choice that would have occupied a lot of disk space. 
The choice screen will be populated with the 12 most widely-  used web-
  browsers that run on Windows 7 as measured semi-  annually by averaging 
monthly usage share data for the previous six months for which data is 
available, with only one browser per vendor listed and shares for differ-
ent released versions of the same vendor’s browsers added together to 
determine the browser’s total usage share224 That will not include Internet 
219  See  www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-  msft/docs/ANNEX_A.doc 
for a detailed description of how this will be implemented in Windows 7.
220  Commission  Decision,  Case  COMP/C-  3/39.530  –  Microsoft,  available 
at  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/39530/final_decision_
en.pdf  (hereinafter  EU  Microsoft  II  decision),  Microsoft’s  commitments  are 
included in the Annex of the Commission’s decision (hereinafter Commitments).
221  Commitment above, para. 8.
222  Commitment, para. 9.
223  Commitment, para. 10.
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Explorer “or any other browser which is based on Internet Explorer’s 
rendering engine and the development or distribution of which is funded 
in whole or in substantial part by Microsoft”225. The choice screen will in 
a horizontal line and in an unbiased way display icons of the basic iden-
tifying information on the web browsers. In addition, the choice screen 
will prominently display the final releases of the five web-  browsers with 
the highest usage share in the EEA, the remaining seven being displayed 
if the user scrolls sideways and in a random order226. In order to ensure a 
higher degree of transparency, only those web browsers included in at last 
two of the three data sources for usage share information for web browsers 
(ComScore, NetApplications and StatCounter) would be considered for 
the choice screen. These will be ranked according to the arithmetic means 
of their numerical ranks in the data sources, taking into account their best 
ranking in two data sources227. It is also specified that ‘Microsoft will bear 
the costs of the technical implementation of the remedy in Windows and 
may not charge for the inclusion of a third party web browser in the Ballot 
Screen’.228
The  ‘must  carry’  remedy  is  limited  to  web-  browsers  and  any  web-
  browser vendor eligible to appear on the choice screen should refrain from 
installing additional software in the same download. This is an interesting 
hybrid. Microsoft has to include the promotion of competing browsers, 
but does not have to distribute the code of third parties’ browsers. The 
duration of the commitment is five years, leaving a wide window of oppor-
tunity to Microsoft’s rivals, and in particular Google, to take hold of a 
significant part of the web-  browser market.
On turning Internet Explorer on or off, ‘Microsoft will ensure that if 
Internet Explorer is turned off, then (i) it can only be turned on through 
user action specifically aimed at turning on Internet Explorer; (ii) the user 
interface cannot be called upon by applications; and (iii) no icons, links 
or shortcuts or any other means will appear within Windows to start a 
download or installation of Internet Explorer’.229 A website will provide all 
necessary information about turning on or off Internet Explorer. In addi-
tion, Microsoft ‘will maintain that page so that other browser vendors can 
link to it if they wish’.230 In essence, the ‘OEMs will be free to pre-  install any 
web browser (or browsers) of their choice on PCs they ship and to set any 
225  Commitment, para. 14.
226  Commitment, para. 13.
227  Commitment, para. 14. 
228  Commitment, para. 14.
229  Commitment, n. 217 above, para. 1.
230  Commitment, para. 1.450  Microsoft on trial
browser as the default web browser’.231 Microsoft has also committed ‘not 
to retaliate against any OEM refraining from developing, using, distribut-
ing, promoting or supporting any software that competes with Microsoft 
web browsers’ through an alteration of commercial relations with that 
OEM, or by withholding the application of preferential terms, or finally by 
entering into any agreement with an OEM that conditions the grant of any 
monetary payment, discount or the provision of preferential licensing terms 
or any other preferential treatment on the choice of Internet Explorer.232
In many ways, the European Commission’s proposed outcome is similar 
to that of the US consent decree. The US consent decree allowed OEMs 
and final consumers to choose the default browser; similarly, OEMs and 
final consumers will choose the default browser in Europe. But there are 
also important differences.
First, the US consent decree was broader since it applied to all mid-
dleware, while the proposed EC outcome covers only browsers. Besides 
browsers, middleware includes email clients, audio-  players, instant mes-
sengers, Java, and other software that functions between the operating 
system and applications.
Secondly, unlike in the United States, where all final consumers are 
given the opportunity to choose a default browser (and other middleware) 
through a ‘set defaults’ screen, Microsoft’s commitment in Europe will 
give a choice of browser to final consumers only if their computer has 
Internet Explorer set as the default browser.233 If the computer manu-
facturer has set up a browser other than Internet Explorer as the default, 
the final consumer will not be presented with the EC ballot screen or the 
‘set defaults’ screen available to US consumers. Thus, the mechanism is 
tilted (i) against Microsoft since computers with a non-  Internet Explorer 
default will not have the same choice (that might have resulted in Internet 
Explorer); and (ii) in favour of non-  Microsoft commercial browser vendors 
(Chrome, Opera, Safari, etc.) who can compensate OEMs to set up their 
231  Commitment, para. 2
232  Commitment, paras 4–5.
233  Also note that in the European Union, final users will be automatically 
prompted to choose a browser, if their computer came with Internet Explorer as 
the default, while in the United States they are not automatically prompted but 
just have the option of choosing defaults. See http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/
blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/07/31/windows-  7-  and-  browser-  choice-  in-  europe.aspx: 
‘Shortly after new Windows PCs are set up by the user, Microsoft will update them 
over the Internet with a consumer ballot software program. If IE is the default 
browser, the user will be presented with a list of other leading browsers and invited 
to select one or more for installation’. No choice screen will appear to users if 
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browser as a default (and then will not have the ballot screen appear to 
final consumers). This may favour non-  Microsoft browser vendors that 
have the deepest pockets.
Thirdly, in the proposed EC outcome, Microsoft is obligated to line up 
many competitors’ browsers for the final consumer to choose from. Thus, 
the Commission’s proposed outcome is a ‘must carry’ rule imposed on 
Microsoft, especially since it applies only to computers where the OEM 
has  installed  Internet  Explorer  as  the  default.  In  the  US  middleware 
default set-  up screen, the consumer is faced with a list of browsers chosen 
by his computer’s manufacturer. Depending on the computer manufac-
turer’s choices, this list could be extensive, but could also be limited to a 
single browser (Internet Explorer or another one) and the consumer would 
need to take extra steps to download other choices.
Fourthly, the proposed EC outcome allows OEMs and consumers to 
uninstall more layers of Internet Explorer, if they wish, than just the front 
end of Internet Explorer that the US decree allows. In the proposed EC 
outcome, an OEM may choose never to show the existence of Internet 
Explorer to the final customer. Even so, deeper layers of the Internet 
Explorer API will remain in Windows when Internet Explorer is ‘off’ and 
an applications manufacturer will be able to call and utilize the Internet 
Explorer  API  for  both  the  ‘on’  and  ‘off’  Internet  Explorer  functions. 
Additionally, users can always ‘turn on’ Internet Explorer even if the OEM 
has turned it off. OEMs cannot permanently disable Internet Explorer.
Fifthly,  for  an  OEM  that  has  chosen  a  default  browser  other  than 
Internet Explorer in Europe, the operating system and security updates 
will not appear to be carried out through Internet Explorer. That is, even 
if Internet Explorer does the updates in the background, the consumer will 
see an interface that does not mention Internet Explorer.234
4.    A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE 
STRUCTURAL REMEDY OPTION
In thinking about a potential structural remedy in the EC case, it is worth 
discussing its imposition in the US case. This is because, in both cases, the 
issue was also leveraging monopoly power to a market of a complemen-
tary good.
In the US case, Judge Jackson adopted the plaintiff’s remedies proposal 
234  This means that the Windows updates will be provided in the same way 
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word-  for-  word  and  imposed  a  break-  up  of  Microsoft  into  two  ‘Baby 
Bills’,235 an operating systems company which would inherit all the oper-
ating systems software, and an ‘applications’ company with all the remain-
ing software assets. Cash and securities holdings of other companies held 
by Microsoft would be split between the resulting entities. Bill Gates and 
other officers of the company would not be allowed to hold executive and 
ownership positions in both of the resulting companies.236
In arguing for the break-  up, the government put forward a number of 
reasons. But since there was only an extremely short formal hearing on 
remedies, there was no chance for both the government’s and Microsoft’s 
cases on remedies to be discussed and evaluated. The government and the 
judge have stated (formally and informally) the following arguments for 
a break-  up:
(i)  that  they  considered  the  repeated  violations  of  antitrust  law  by 
Microsoft  as  an  indication  that  Microsoft  would  not  follow  any 
conduct or contractual restrictions; in fact, in some informal remarks, 
government officials believe that they were ‘tricked’ by Microsoft in 
settling the 1995 case with terms that Microsoft was able to exploit;
(ii)  that the lack of remorse by Microsoft’s executives was a clear indica-
tion that Microsoft ‘could not be trusted’ to implement any other 
remedy;
(iii)  that the break-  up was a ‘surgical cut’ that would create the least 
interference with business;
(iv)  AT&T and the rest of the telecommunications industry benefited 
from AT&T’s break-  up, and so should Microsoft and the software 
industry—after all both industries have network effects;
(v)  the break-  up would eliminate the incentive for vertical foreclosure; 
and
(vi)  the break-  up would reduce the ‘applications barrier to entry’ since 
now  the  applications  company  might  write  popular  Microsoft 
  applications (such as MS Office) for other platforms.
The government failed to show that the proposed (and later abandoned) 
break-  up was the appropriate remedy. The US Department of Justice did 
235  This is a word-  play on ‘Baby Bells’ that was used in referring to AT&T and 
the first name of the co-  founder and then CEO of Microsoft, Bill Gates. 
236  For  a  more  detailed  evaluation  of  the  final  US  remedy,  see  Nicholas 
Economides,  ‘Comment  of  Nicholas  S.  Economides  on  the  Revised  Proposed 
Final Judgment in United States v. Microsoft’, 22 January 2002, available at www.
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not perform the appropriate cost-  benefit analysis to show that conduct 
remedies were not sufficient and that a break-  up was necessary. None 
of the affidavits in the remedies phase even approached a discussion on 
evaluating alternatives. Additionally, a few weeks before Judge Jackson’s 
decision,  under  the  supervision  of  Judge  Posner,  the  government  and 
Microsoft had reached a compromise that imposed only conduct rem-
edies.237 The government failed to justify why it was ready to compromise 
a few weeks earlier (in the settlement negotiated by Judge Richard Posner 
who was asked to try to find a settlement by Judge Jackson) on behav-
ioural remedies, but later claimed that structural remedies were necessary. 
Harry First notes that the plaintiffs would probably have been more suc-
cessful ‘had they clearly had such a remedy in mind at an earlier stage in 
the proceeding’.238
The first argument of the government in support of a break-  up does 
not stand to reason. The 1995 case was settled with a decree that explicitly 
stated that Microsoft could include in its operating system any additional 
functionality. It is reasonable that Microsoft (or any observer, includ-
ing the US Department of Justice) would believe, given the 1995 consent 
decree,  that  adding  browser  functionality  to  Windows  did  not  violate 
the consent decree.239 This, of course, does not mean that adding such 
functionality would not violate antitrust law in general, but it lays to 
rest the idea that the government was tricked by Microsoft. The fact that 
companies and antitrust enforcers often have an asymmetry of informa-
tion is very common and expected, and cannot be considered a ‘trick’, or 
a reason not to enter into agreements between antitrust authorities and 
companies.
The second argument of the plaintiffs in support of the break-  up seems 
excessive. Antitrust enforcement is not an emotional tug of war in which 
the egos of either the plaintiffs or the defendants need to be satisfied. The 
show of remorse or lack thereof by Microsoft executives could not pos-
sibly define the remedy. We find it hard to believe that the judge would 
be correct in finding a different remedy appropriate if enough Microsoft 
executives simply showed public remorse. Moreover, Microsoft, like any 
other defendant, had a right to appeal (and it did so). A defendant’s belief 
that he will prevail on appeal should not result in punishment.
237  The settlement was rejected by the states.
238  First, n. 178 above, 32.
239  The dispute regarding the application of the 1995 consent decree ended 
with a District of Columbia Circuit ruling in favour of Microsoft’s understanding 
of the meaning of the decree. United States v Microsofti, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir 
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The third argument, that the break-  up would be a surgical cut and 
therefore would disrupt the industry the least, is countered by the facts. 
A  break-  up  of  Microsoft  would  eliminate  Microsoft  as  a  flexible  and 
formidable competitor. The wholehearted endorsement of a break-  up by 
Microsoft’s competitors in servers and back office (who were not found in 
the US case to have incurred damages through the Windows monopoly 
but would greatly benefit from the confusion and disruption created by 
a Microsoft break-  up) is evidence that the break-  up would be one of the 
most disruptive possible outcomes. Generally, break-  ups of large compa-
nies are complicated and drawn-  out affairs that disrupt the company that 
is broken up, the producers of complementary goods to its products, and 
its customers.
The fourth argument, that since AT&T’s 1982 break-  up was success-
ful, so would Microsoft’s, is incorrect. AT&T was divided into the long-
  distance company (AT&T), and seven regional operating companies, each 
of which remained a regulated local telecommunications monopoly until 
1996. The destruction of AT&T’s long-  distance monopoly encouraged 
competition, which brought sharply lower prices and immense consumer 
benefits. However, there are a number of key differences between the two 
companies and their competitive situations, and these differences make it 
very likely that a Microsoft break-  up, besides harming Microsoft, would 
harm consumers and the computer industry.
In  1981,  AT&T  was  a  100-  year-  old  regulated  monopoly  with  many 
layers of management. For historical reasons, the local phone companies 
within the old AT&T, such as New York Telephone, were managed sepa-
rately from the ‘long lines’ division. Thus, it was not difficult to separate 
the divisions since they functioned on many levels as separate companies. 
AT&T also had an abundance of managers to help cope with the break-
  up. By contrast, Microsoft is a young, entrepreneurial company run by few 
top executives, and its divisions are fluid. While this has made Microsoft 
an efficient and successful company, it also means that a break-  up would 
have  posed  significant  managerial  problems  and  severely  reduced  the 
company’s flexibility. Finally, AT&T was a regulated utility, and regula-
tion guaranteed that the companies emerging from the break-  up stayed 
interconnected. In contrast, the Microsoft break-  up would likely to lead 
to incompatibilities and further loss of efficiency.
The US Department of Justice’s two-  way break-  up plan was premised 
on the hope that an autonomous applications company would create a 
new operating system to compete with Windows. But at trial it was stipu-
lated that more than 70,000 applications run on Windows, creating what 
the government called ‘the applications barrier to entry’ in the operating 
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be unlikely to be able single-  handedly to create a successful rival operating 
system in short order.
The break-  up of Microsoft, first proposed by the government, imposed 
by Judge Jackson, and, after the District of Columbia Court of Appeal’s 
decision not pursued by the government, would have had detrimental 
effects. First, the break-  up would probably have resulted in higher prices. 
If the US Department of Justice was correct and Microsoft kept its OS 
prices low so that it could exercise its monopoly power in the adjacent 
browser market, the post-  break-  up ‘Baby Bill’ that would inherit the oper-
ating system would have no incentive to keep the price low. The OS Baby 
Bill would no longer have the incentive to disadvantage any applications 
companies. Thus, if the US Department of Justice’s theories are correct, 
the OS Baby Bill would exercise its monopoly power and raise the price of 
the operating system to the detriment of consumers. If the US Department 
of  Justice  was  correct  and  Microsoft  has  significant  monopoly  power 
because of the ‘applications barrier to entry’, higher prices would be the 
direct result of the break-  up. Secondly, as explained earlier, the break-  up 
would likely eliminate the efficiencies that make Microsoft a flexible and 
formidable competitor.
A break-  up would likely temporarily eliminate the incentive for interfer-
ence from operating systems to applications and vice versa. Of course, the 
same can and has been accomplished by conduct restrictions without the 
cost and the disruption of a break-  up. Moreover, the district court’s break-
  up proposal did not impose permanent restrictions on the post-  break-  up 
functions of the resulting companies. The OS and the applications Baby 
Bills would have been able to enter into each other’s business soon after 
the break-  up. It is very likely that a few years after such a break-  up, one of 
the resulting companies would dominate both markets.
Alternative Remedies
The difficulty of devising adequate remedies that address the applications 
entry barrier issue as well as the distributional advantage of Windows, and 
the alleged ‘failure’ of the traditional conduct remedies employed in this 
case,240 led some commentators to suggest alternative and   unconventional 
remedies, including non-  antitrust alternatives.
240  Carl Shapiro, ‘Microsoft: A Remedial Failure’ (2009) 75 Antitrust Law 
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Public procurement procedures as an antitrust remedy: reducing the 
applications barrier
Regulation  is  not  the  only  way  states  can  intervene  in  the  market-
place.  Increasingly,  state  ownership  and/or  state  contracting/spending 
are  employed  in  order  to  achieve  specific  public  policy  objectives.241 
Competition in the marketplace might be one of those objectives. Professor 
Herbert  Hovenkamp  raised  the  possibility  of  public  contracting  being 
used as a tool to reduce Microsoft’s applications barrier to entry, and gave 
the example of Alco, where the government sold the productive capacity 
of aluminum it owned under the conditions of the Surplus Property Act, 
which ‘required the government to consider the impact on competition 
whenever it sold a significant piece of private property to a private firm’ 
and excluded Alco from participating to the bid for government plants.242 
According to Hovenkamp, ‘(t)oday the government could do something 
similar  by  requiring  its  departments  and  agencies  to  use  open-  source 
  software as an alternative to Microsoft’s products’.243
This would increase the open source software installed base, as gov-
ernments are among the principal purchasers of software products, and 
would  help  the  economy  move  from  a  monopolized  to  a  competitive 
computer platform network. The benefits for innovation would be par-
ticularly important, as recent studies have showed that innovative incen-
tives (investments in applications) are sometimes greater for open source 
than for proprietary software platforms.244 Microsoft would be able to 
participate in the government bidding process, under the condition that 
it submits its own open source products, either by developing new prod-
ucts or by making public the source code of Windows. This may improve 
allocative efficiency, as the government would also be able to purchase 
software products at a lower price (not including remuneration for intel-
lectual property rights), and dynamic efficiency with increased competition 
between different products (assuming that a competitive market is better 
suited for innovation than a monopolistic market for software products). 
241  See  Christopher  McCrudden,  Buying  Social  Justice  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
242  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), p. 302. 
243  Hovenkamp, n. 242 above.
244  Nicholas Economides and Evangelos Katsamakas, ‘Linux v. Windows: A 
Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation Incentives for Open Source 
and Proprietary Software Platforms’ in Juergen Bitzer and Philip J.H. Schroeder 
(eds), The Economics of Open Source Software Development (Elsevier Publishers, 
2006),  available  at  www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Katsamakas_
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One could also envision as a condition for Microsoft’s participation in 
a call for tenders the unbundling of its applications from the operating 
system so as to guarantee an installed base to competing formats, or a 
wide  interoperability  with  all  existing  or  new  formats.  Of  course,  any 
imposed restriction of software choice would also precipitate reductions 
in utility of government users, at least in the short run. These utility losses 
of the Hovenkamp proposal have to be considered and balanced with the 
potential benefits outlined above.245
The decision of the Brazilian government to switch from Microsoft pro-
prietary software to open source software and to pass legislation making 
the use of open source software mandatory for governmental departments 
was reportedly aiming to force Microsoft to rethink its business model.246 
The German government has also adopted guidelines for federal, state 
and local governments, as well as other public sector agencies, interested 
to migrate from Microsoft proprietary technology to open source software 
and signed contracts with IBM for computer systems based on Linux 
operating systems.247
These initiatives may have influenced Microsoft’s progressive commit-
ment with interoperability, and probably led to the publication of the 
‘interoperability principles.248 An example may be the interoperability of 
Microsoft’s former proprietary OOXML (Office Open XML file format), 
now a formal ISO standard,249 with the OpenDocument Format (ODF) 
standard, which is supported by Sun Microsystems, IBM, Novell, Nokia, 
245  Additionally, there would be far-  reaching effects into the realm of indus-
trial policy if the government specified a particular model of software develop-
ment,  predicting  what  finished  software  products  would  provide  the  greatest 
value per dollar spent. If Microsoft is forced to make the Windows source code 
public, this would reduce Microsoft’s incentives to drive that product forward 
with new innovations, as others could then offer essentially the same product for 
free, possibly only subject to risk of patent infringement suits. Also, there is no 
significant evidence that the open source model can become a replacement for 
for-  profit software. See Nicholas Economides and Evangelos Katsamakas, ‘Two-
  sided  Competition  of  Proprietary  vs.  Open  Source  Technology  Platforms  and 
the Implications for the Software Industry’ (2006) 52 Management Science 1057, 
available  at  www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Katsamakas_Two-  sided.
pdf; Economides and Katsamakas, n. 244 above.
246  See Steve Kingstone, ‘Brazil adopts open-  source software’, BBC News, 2 
June 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4602325.stm.
247  See ‘IBM signs Linux deal with Germany’, BBC News, 3 June 2002, avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2023127.stm.
248  See www.microsoft.com/interop/principles/default.mspx.
249  See  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standardization_of_Office_Open_XML# 
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Intel and Red Hat. This led to the release of Microsoft Office 2007 service 
pack 2, a product that, according to Microsoft, ‘provides built-  in support 
for more file formats than any other productivity suite on the market’ and 
which comes with a ‘new programming interface that will make it easy for 
developers to make any other document format show up in the drop down 
menu and be selected by users as their default, putting it on a par with the 
major formats already supported in Office 2007’.250 This business culture 
evolution may have been provoked by the recent competition law chal-
lenges on interoperability and the use of public procurement as a way to 
increase competition in the marketplace. The cumulative impact of these 
combined antitrust and non-  antitrust remedies is outside the scope of this 
study and should be empirically examined.
Standard setting organization and de facto versus de jure standardization
The alleged de facto standardization of the Windows architecture work 
group computing environment or the Windows media-  player platform 
through the leveraging of Microsoft’s dominant position in the operating 
systems market was a development that both the European Commission 
and the CFI abhorred.251 The CFI was particularly clear that its reserva-
tions did not concern the process of standardization, which may provide 
benefits to consumers, but the way this de facto standardization took place 
in this particular case. The Court noted that ‘(a)lthough, generally, stand-
ardization may effectively present certain advantages, it cannot be allowed 
to be imposed unilaterally by an undertaking in a dominant position by 
means of tying’.252
A possible alternative is to delegate the task of developing interoper-
able standards to an SSO, which will assist the competition law author-
ity or court with a burdensome monitoring mechanism in implementing 
interoperability requirements. In this case, the standard will not emerge 
by a process of de facto standardization by a dominant firm but will be 
the outcome of negotiations. The SSO’s activity will be closely monitored 
250  See  http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/04/28/
following-  through-  on-  our-  commitment-  to-  interoperability.aspx.
251  See Decision, para. 779, where the Commission noted that the position of 
Microsoft on the client PC operating systems market will enable it to ‘determine to 
a large extent and independently of its competitors the set of coherent communica-
tions rules that will govern the de facto standard for interoperability in work group 
networks’. But note that standardization to WMA and WMV never occurred, but 
was assumed by the Commission to be later disproved in actuality. Today, as well 
as before the imposition of the Windows XP N remedy, WMA and WMV are not 
dominant media formats.
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in order to avoid cartel-  like behaviour or deceptive conduct, and to guar-
antee transparent and open procedures.253 However, different problems 
with this specific solution are the imbalance of power between Microsoft 
and its competitors in the SSO and the subsequent risk that the stand-
ard  approved  will  not  be  ‘sufficiently’  interoperable  with  competitors’ 
products.254 Additionally, the standard setting process is slow and could 
thus retard innovation in some dimensions while accelerating it in others. 
Furthermore,  an  agreement  by  competitors  on  a  standard  tends  to 
restrict competition because competitors are limited largely to compet-
ing within the specific narrow confines of the standard, that is, just the 
best implementation of it. It follows that breakthrough innovation with 
alternative approaches tends not to occur because everyone is focused on 
  implementation of the standard.
5.  CONCLUSION
The success or the failure of the remedial action in the US and the EC 
Microsoft cases is still, five years after the District of Columbia Circuit 
decision on remedies in the United States and the same period since the 
Commission’s Decision, a matter of controversy.255 Some tend to link 
the alleged failure of the remedy, or its unexpected costs and scope, with 
the issue of liability, professing the notion of what has become known as ‘if 
253  See Philip J. Weiser, ‘Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, 
Microsoft, and Beyond’ (2009) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 271. See, however, the 
rejection of the ‘truth-  in-  standards’ provisions suggested to the non-  settling states 
by the District of Columbia Circuit on the ground that these were unrelated to 
the violation found. The non-  settling states would have required Microsoft to 
continue supporting any industry standard it has publicly claimed to support until 
it publicly disclaims such support, or the standard expires or is rescinded by the 
standard setting body, and to continue to support an industry standard any time it 
makes a proprietary alteration. 
254  See the recent investigation by the European Commission of the inter-
operability of OOXML, which was approved as an ISO-  recognized international 
standard in April 2008. However, there have been allegations (currently being 
investigated by the European Commission) that there have been irregularities or 
attempts to influence the vote at the European Committee for Standardization 
and the International Organization for Standardization, thus illustrating the dif-
ficulties of guaranteeing the transparency of the process. See www.pcworld.com/
article/144036/microsofts_iso_win_may_raise_antitrust_issues.html. 
255  See, most recently, the exchange between Shapiro, n. 240 above and Keith 
N. Hylton, ‘Remedies, Antitrust Law and Microsoft: Comment of Shapiro’ (2009) 
75 Antitrust Law Journal 773.460  Microsoft on trial
you cannot fix it, it isn’t broken’. Although it is clear that, in principle, the 
costs of remedies should not outweigh the consumer benefit they achieve, 
it is also contended that plaintiffs employ a sequential information model 
that addresses one issue at a time. It would be therefore inappropriate to 
dismiss a case simply because the plaintiff did not identify an adequate 
remedy. Harry First rightly observes that ‘it seems inevitable that plain-
tiffs will refine their case as they learn more in the course of the litigation 
process’, in particular in high-  tech industries where technological change 
is so complex and so rapid that there is a need for quick action.256
At the same time, the litigation process is cheap compared to competi-
tion in price or product development. Thus, rivals have significant incen-
tives to sue global dominant firms on multiple grounds and in multiple 
jurisdictions with the expectation that some suit will ultimately be suc-
cessful in some jurisdiction. And, sometimes, one or more of these cases is 
picked up and pursued by an antitrust authority, as happened with the two 
cases against Microsoft, one in the United States and one in the European 
Union. To some extent, the lack of fully-  thought-  out remedies in both of 
these cases is a consequence of the history of the cases, i.e., how they were 
started by allegations of rivals who were primarily interested in improv-
ing  their  competitive  position  vis-  à-  vis  the  dominant  firm  rather  than 
  remedying all the consequences of anti-  competitive behaviour.
The anti-  competitive effects of these practices were clearly identified and 
a dominant narrative emerged as a retrospective rationalization of differ-
ent practices and strategies adopted by Microsoft that harmed consumers: 
the maintenance of monopoly story in the US case and the leveraging story 
in the EC case. The identification of a specific consumer harm story could 
operate as a limit to the identification of adequate remedies. Antitrust 
liability stories transcend the different stages of a case, including the issue 
of remedies that need to address the specific consumer harm. The US 
Microsoft case was problematic in this respect as there was no a direct link 
between the antitrust liability story of maintenance of monopoly and the 
forward-  looking remedies adopted. It is clear that Microsoft executives 
were concerned by the potential (but unlikely) erosion of the Windows 
platform’s ubiquity from the joint actions of Sun and Java. The competi-
tive threat to Windows did not materialize but Microsoft raised the walls 
of its fortress preventively in order to defend its position from Java’s and 
Sun’s naval attack (if one employs Carl Schapiro’s fortress metaphor).257 
But is it legitimate to require dominant firms to bring down the walls of 
256  First, n. 178 above, 31.
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their fortress or to keep them at the same level they were before, when they 
identify, perhaps wrongly, the existence of a potential threat of attack? 
There is a fine conceptual line between an illegitimate preventive wall-
  raising exercise and a legitimate meeting of competition defence. Lowering 
the wall some centimetres will certainly be an option, but the question will 
then be of how much lower and for what reason.
In comparison, the narrative of the first EC Microsoft case fits better 
with the remedies imposed. The issue here was that the dominant firm was 
using an existing fort to attack a new area and extend its fortification. The 
dominant firm would have thus been able to reinforce the defences of its 
existing fort and to increase the risks for those attacking it. The remedy 
in this case seems more straightforward in comparison with the previous 
setting: terminating the extension of the fortification will bring the end of 
both the ambition to reinforce the existing fortifications and to occupy a 
new area.
What this metaphor shows is that the choice of the adequate narrative 
among different consumer harm stories should correspond to the remedy 
sought. This was certainly the case with the EC Microsoft case but not 
with the US Microsoft case, where the difficulty for the leveraging argu-
ment to be accepted by the courts, as well as a change in the administra-
tion and possibly the reframing of the government’s claim,258 led to the 
development of a narrative (maintenance of monopoly) that had only 
an indirect link with the bulk of the forward-  looking remedies that were 
finally imposed.
This  mismatch  between  the  consumer  harm  story/narrative  and  the 
remedy sought is also manifest in the second EC Microsoft case. Although 
the  Commission  seemed  to  advance  a  consumer  harm  story  based  on 
the relatively favourable (for its position) case law on tying, establishing 
some form of quasi per se illegality of tying if a company has a dominant 
position, the ‘must carry’ commitment accepted by the Commission as 
an adequate remedy for the competition problem does not address this 
particular issue. Unbundling would have certainly looked like the most 
adequate  remedy  for  a  leveraging  concern.  However,  the  Commission 
reacted negatively when Microsoft decided to unbundle Internet Explorer 
from Windows 7 E. The ‘must carry’ remedy adopted fits better with 
an essential facilities case, where Windows would have been considered 
indispensable for the distribution of a web-  browser. We do not criticize 
the remedy as such, which could perhaps prove to be effective, in terms 
258  Harry First and Andrew I. Gavil, ‘Re-  framing Windows: The Durable 
Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation’ (2006) Utah Law Review 679, 682.462  Microsoft on trial
of reinvigorating competition in the web-  browser market, but rather the 
apparent mismatch between the consumer harm story and the remedy. 
It would be particularly damaging for the development of competition 
law and economic growth in general if plaintiffs could employ the less 
demanding (in terms of standard of proof) theory of consumer harm in 
order to achieve the most far-  reaching (in terms of commitments from a 
dominant firm) remedies. The problem cannot be solved by the characteri-
zation of the Microsoft case as strictly a ‘tying’ case. The classification of 
abuses under Article 82 EC is not a clear-  cut exercise and there is always a 
fine conceptual line that distinguishes different categories of abuses, if one 
takes an effects-  based approach.259
259  See Ioannis Lianos, ‘Categorical Thinking in Competition Law and the 
“Effects-  based” Approach in Article 82 EC’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed.), Article 82 EC: 
Reflections on its Recent Evolution (Oxford: Hart, 2009), pp. 19–49.